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I. INTRODUCTION 
The tenn postmodemism, as applied to the law, has engendered much 
controversy.l It has been called "dangerous,,2 and characterized as 
"trendy,,3 by some and "useless" or "irrelevant" by others.4 More recently it 
has been branded as un-Americans and frequently is declared "dead.,,6 
1 The term "postmodern" has generated intense debate and outright academic quarrels not just 
in law but in other disciples such as literature. Compare Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: 
Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional "Meaning" for the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. REv. 461, 
461 (1997) (a legal parody of postmodern themes), and Arthur Austin, A Primer & 
Deconstruction's "Rhapsody of Word plays, " 71 N.C. L. REv. 201, 202-03 (1992), and Stephen 
M. Feldman, An Arrow to the Heart: The Love and Death of Postmodern Legal Scholarship, 54 
VAND. L. REv. 2351, 2352 (2001), with Katherine C. Sheehan, Caring for Deconstruction, 12 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 85, 88 (2000) (noting the same types of reactions provoked by 
postmodernism and deconstruction by feminist scholars), and CHRISTOPHER KEEP ET AL., 
POSTMODERNISM AND THE POSTMODERN NOVEL (2000), available at http://elab.eserveLorg 
Ihfl0256.html. 
2 See John C.P. Goldberg, On the Merits: A Response to Professor Sherry, 50 VAND. L. REv. 
537,550-51 (1997) (referring to Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know It 
Learned from the Warren Court, 50 VAND. L. REv. 459, 485 (1997)); see also Michael 
Donaldson, Some Reservations About Law and Postmodernism, 40 AM. J. JURlS. 335, 339 (1995); 
Lisa Eichhorn, Writing in the Legal Academy: A Dangerous Supplement?, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 105, 
141 (1998). 
3 See Vgo Mattei & Anna di Robilant, The Art and Science of Critical Scholarship: 
Postmodernism and International Style in the Legal Architecture of Europe, 75 TUL. L. REv. 
1053, 1057 (2001). 
4 See Feldman, supra note 1, at 2356 (citing ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 204 (1997)). 
5 See Stanley Fish, Don't Blame Relativism, 3 THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 27, 28 (2002), 
available at http://www.gwu.edul~ccps/rcqjFish.pdf (commenting on post-9/11 attacks on 
postmodernism such as Edward Rothstein's, Attacks on U.S. Challenge the Perspectives of 
Postmodern True Believers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2001, at AI7); see also Jay P. Moran, 
Postmodernism's Misguided Place in Legal Scholarship: Chaos Theory, Deconstruction, and 
Some Insights from Thomas Pynchon's Fiction, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 155, 159 (1997); 
Richard Rorty, The Unpatriotic Academy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1994, § 4, at 15, reprinted in 
RICHARD RORRY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 252 (2000). 
6 See Gary Pavela, Applying the Power of Association on Campus: A Model Code of 
Academic Integrity, 24 J.C. & V.L. 97, 102 (1997); see also Glen Scott Allen, Baptismal 
Eulogies: Reconstructing Deconstruction from the Ashes, 3 POSTMODERN CULTURE,-r 4-8 (Jan. 
1993), available at http://www .iath.virginia.edulpmc/text-only/issue.193/review-7 .193; Katherine 
C. Sheehan, Caring for Deconstruction, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 85, 89 (2000) (citing JEFFREY 
T. NEALON, DOUBLE READING: POSTMODERNISM AFTER DECONSTRUCTION 22 (1993)); see 
generally AFTER POSTMODERNISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL REALISM (Jose Lopez & 
Garry Potter eds., 2001); .. TERRY EAGLETON, AFTER THEORY (2003) (arguing postmodern literary 
theory was relevant in its heyday, but not any more). 
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Postmodernism is an undeniably important concept and has deeply affected 
the way texts are taught to be read and written.7 Postmodemism's effect on 
legal theory has also been profound.8 Many would agree postmodernism is 
impossible to ignore and firmly imbedded in the discourse of the legal 
academy and pedagogy of many law classes. 9 
This Article explores the ways postmodernism has affected the teaching 
of legal writing in American law schools. While most law school classes 
are modernist in structure and pedagogy, the legal writing course in most 
law schools is, consciously or unconsciously, often quite postmodern. On 
one hand, legal writing professors' work within a modernist paradigm 
which seeks to normalize the law and create unitary meaning from the 
morass of texts and ideas considered the law. 1o On the other hand, legal 
writing professors have a dangerous postmodern bent to their teaching and 
engage in a number of postmodern paradoxes in their work in the 
academy.ll It is the postmodern components of legal writing professors' 
work that provides strength to the profession and helps prepare law students 
for both modernity and postmodernity.12 Far from being dead or irrelevant, 
7 See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO 
POSTMODERISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 188-98 (2000); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN 
LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURIES END 189-91 (1996); Douglas 
Litowitz, In Defense of Postmodernism, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 39, 41 (2000). 
8 See FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 188-98. 
9 See id. at 137; MINDA, supra note 7, at 91, 189, 251; Peter C. Schank, Understanding 
Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2505, 
2507 (1992). Proof of postmodernism's ubiquity in legal scholarship is that a Westlaw search on 
March 6, 2006 for the words "postmodem" and "postmodemism" resulted in over 5300 entries. 
10 See David S. Romantz, The Truth About Cats and Dogs: Legal Writing Courses and the 
Law School Curriculum, 52 U. KAN. L. REv. 105, 127-36 (2003). 
11 See Eichhorn, supra note 2, at 105 ("The term 'dangerous supplement' stems from Jacques 
Derrida's analysis of the relationship between speech and writing."); see also Joel Cornwell, 
Legal Writing as a Kind of Philosophy, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1091, 1120-21 (1997). A number of 
critics have branded postmodernism as dangerous. See generally POSTMODERNISM AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS: THEORIES, PRACTICES (E. Ann Kaplan ed., 1988) (a collection of essays branding 
postmodernism as dangerous); see also HANS BERTENS, THE IDEA OF THE POSTMODERN: A 
HISTORY 203 (1995) (quoting Nancy Hartsock, Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?, in 
FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 157, 160 (Linda 1. Nicholson ed., 1990)); Goldberg, supra note 2, at 
550 (responding to Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know It Learned from 
the Warren Court, 50 VAND. L. REV. 459, 485 (1997)). 
12To be able to function within the norms of the legal profession, students need to be 
grounded in modernity; to be able to function in the age of globalism and the internet, students 
need also the ability to function in the postmodern era. See infra Part III. 
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postmodemism is still alive and well in many aspects of the legal writing 
classroom. 13 This Article seeks to acknowledge the contribution 
postmodemism has made to the teaching of legal writing and how 
postmodemism's influence on legal writing has affected the legal academy 
as a whole. 
II. DEFINING POSTMODERNISM 
Part of the controversy surrounding postmodemism comes from the fact 
that it does not have one clear definition. 14 Another problem is the abstruse 
language used by many writers on the subject. IS In fact, postmodernism has 
often been identified with poor writing and communication skills.16 The 
term "pomobabble" emerged within pop culture to illustrate this trend.17 
Like most articles addressing postmodemism, this one begins by defining 
the term and lamenting the lack of a clear definition. IS It is this lack of clear 
defmition that makes postmodemism difficult to appreciate and creates 
I3To dismiss or denigrate postmodemism and its eontribution to the teaching oflegal writing 
is either a disservice to or a misunderstanding of the important tools postmodernism provides to 
teachers, scholars, students and practitioners of the law. 
14 See Donaldson, supra note 2, at 335 (citing Jennifer Wicke, Postmodern Identity and the 
Legal Subject, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 455,456 (1991» (referring to Jennifer Wicke, who states in 
her attempt to define postmodemism, that there are "more than thirty-one flavors" to be found). 
Even the spelling of the word is uncertain: "Post-modernism" tends to be used by critics of 
postmodemism, "postmodernism" by its supporters. See Postmodemism, available at 
http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilPostmodemism (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). 
15 Giving an example of abstruse language, Clare O'Farrell writes: 
Opening a book with the hermetic title Postmodernism and Heterology, one reads: "The 
paradigmatics of and pragmatics of the game, the philosophies of erotics, and the 
privilege accorded the work of art and literature-as players in the critical/theoretical 
field-have to be related to the question of writing in post-structuralism." 
Clare 0' Farrell, Postmodernismfor the Uninitiated, in UNDERSTANDING EDUCATION: CONTEXTS 
AND AGENDAS FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 11 (Daphne Meamore et al. eds., 1999), available at 
http://michel-foucault.com/pomo.html (quoting JULIAN PERFANIS, HETEROLOGY AND THE 
POSlMODERN: BATAILLE, BAUDRlLLARD AND LYOTARD 5 (1991». O'Farrell also includes this 
joke: "'What do you get when you cross a Mafiosi with a postmodemist?' The answer of course 
is 'someone who will make you an offer you can't understand.'" !d. 
16 See id.; see also Arrow, supra note 1, at 608; Douglas Litowitz, Postmodernism Without 
the 'Pornobabble', 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 41, 45-46, 76 (2000). 
17 See Arrow, supra note I, at 608. 
18 "Everyone begins ;the discussion of postmodemism by asking what the word could possibly 
mean." JOHN MCGOWAN, POSTMODERNISM AND ITS CRlTICS, at ix (1991). 
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problems in its application to legal contexts. Even more irksome to many 
in the legal community, however, is postmodernism's disdain for and 
rejection of the very act of creating a single definition.19 
The term postmodernism is generally used in two ways.20 In popular 
usage and in its most simple form, the term postmodernism is used as a 
marker of a cultural era identified as the period after modernism or the post-
modem era.21 Modernism, as an era, is defined as the period when people 
came to terms with the Industrial Age and explored innovative and non-
traditional methods of expression?2 Under this usage, postmodernism is 
defmed as simply the period when people are coming to terms with the 
computer or information age as opposed to the Industrial Age. Following 
this definition, we are all living in a postmodern period and any 
developments coming from this electronic or information age, can be 
considered postmodern.23 Thus, a piece of legislation regulating the 
internet, such as the Financial Services Modernization Ace4 or the United 
19 Stephen Feldman specifically avoids defining postmodernism, stating: "A proffered 
definition for postmodernism would appear to reduce it to some fundamental core or essence, 
which would be too foundationalist, too essentialist-too modernist." See FELDMAN, supra note 
7, at 38. 
20 See J.M. Balkin, What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1966, 1967-
69 (1992); see also James Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral Sentiments? Integrity. 
PostModernism and Justice, 51 STAN. L. REv. 493, 497 (1999) (stating that "it seems useful to 
distinguish between postmodernism as a kind of arch cultural schtick and post-modernism as an 
earnest epistemology"). Michael Donaldson points out that postmodernism is also used as a 
methodology, "a way of reading texts and interpreting history using a cluster of tools, the chief of 
which is deconstruction." Donaldson, supra note 2, at 336 (1995). I see the methodology as 
integrated into the second part of my definition. The methodology is one of the products 
emerging from the theory-based defmition of postmodemism. 
21 Ihab Hassan points out that the term postmodern was used in a number of instances from as 
early as 1870 and the 1930s before the more recent popular use. Ihab Hassan, From 
Postmodernism to Postmodernity: The Local/Global Context, 25 PHIL. & LITERATURE 1, 16 
(2001), available at http://www.ihabhassan.comlpostmodernism_to_postmodernity.htm. Charles 
Jencks' The Language of Postmodern Architecture is credited as among the more recent works to 
shape and popularize the term. See, e.g., ROBERT ATKlNS, ART SPEAK: A GUIDE TO 
CONTEMPORARY IDEAS, MOVEMENTS, AND BUZZWORDS, 1945 TO THE PRESENT, 118-20 (2d ed. 
1997). 
22 See AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICflONARY 876 (4th ed. 2006). 
23 J.M. Balkin separates the use of postmodernism as a label for or a referent to products 
emerging from the postmodern era. See J.M Balkin, What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 1966,1969 (1992). 
24 See Granun-Leach-BIiley Financial Services Modernization Act, 15 U.s.c. §§ 6801-6809 
(2000). In fact, the Financial Services and Modernization Act and the Safe Harbor Agreement 
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States-ED Safe Harbor Agreement,25 could be called postmodern legislation 
or a postmodern law.26 
Such a broad definition of postmodernism fails to captnre the more 
. radical and complex meanings attached to the word by scholars in the past 
thirty years.27 Scholars define and use the term postmodern not just to refer 
to an era but to a philosophical movement that has profoundly affected the 
way scholars look at the law and legal text in particular.28 The core of this 
movement is a rejection of modernism. 29 
Modernism has been characterized as a period when tradition and 
authority were rejected in favor of reason and science.3o It is associated 
also can be considered postmodem because they fit the characteristics ofpostmodern theory. See 
generally Adam G. Todd, Fractured Freedoms: The United States' Postmodern Approach to 
Protecting Privacy, in AMERICAN FREEDOMS, AMERICAN (DIS)ORDERS 319 (Zbigniew Lewicki 
ed., 2004). 
25 See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 666,45 (July 24, 2000) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. 216 and 15 C.P.R. 902). 
26In order to clarifY the distinction between postmodernism as an identifier of an era as 
opposed to a theory or philosophy, scholars refer to the period of postmodemism as the "era of 
postmodernity." See Balkin, supra note 23, at 1969; see also FELDMfu"<. supra note 7, at 8-9. 
27Peldman points out that some scholars distinguish the different uses of the word 
"postmodernism" by referring to "postmoderrusm" as a cultural phenomenon and "postmodernity" 
"as a particular social, political, and economic arrangement." FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 8-9. 
28 See Donaldson, supra note 2, at 337 ("Postmodernism seeks to question not only 
objectivity, but the notion of subjectivity as well. It is this third branch of postmodernism, which 
both strives to be and loathes becoming a theory, which I believe presents a great danger for 
law."); Frances J. Mootz Ill, Postmodern Constitutionalism as Materialism, 91 MICH. L. REv. 
515, 520 (1992) ("Simply by asking how postmodem cultural forces are affecting legal practice, 
we adopt a critical and interpretive posture toward the social conceptions ... [without which] we 
would not have 'postmodernity. "'). 
29 Since postmodernism is essentially defmed by its rejection of modernism, any discussion 
needs to begin with a clear understanding of the definition of modernism. Adding to the 
confusion is the fact that the term "modernism" is also difficult to defme. See Postmodernism, 
www.jahsonic.comIPostModernism.html(last visited Sept. 27, 2006); see also Dale Jamieson, 
The Poverty of Postmodernist Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 577, 577-78 (1991) ("The fIrst point 
to be noted is that postmodernism obviously is to be understood in relation to modernism. 
Characterizing an intellectual position relationally in this way defers the problem of definition. 
Since it's not very clear what modernism is, it's not very clear what postmodernism is."); Gary 
Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at Century's End, 95 MICH. L. 
REv. 1927, 1933 (1997) ("[P]ostmodemism is generally defined by reference-it is that which is 
not modem."). 
30 See James Morley, Defining Postmodernism, in THE ELECTRONIC LABYRINTH (Christopher 
Keep et al. eds., 2000), available athttp://elab.eserver.orgIhfl0242.html; see also Donaldson, 
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with the Age of Enlightenment, the Renaissance and the Protestant 
reformation when divine and feudal authorities gave way to the rise of 
mercantilism, industrialization and secular governance.3l Modernists work 
to reduce meanings of ideas, words and texts to an "essential core or single 
truth.,,32 Modernism assumes the autonomous and rational individual is 
solely responsible for fmding the truth and creating meaning from the 
world. 33 
Postrnodernists claim modernism is too centralized and monolithic in its 
mindset.34 Modernists rejected tradition and authority in favor of reason 
and science, but its views of reason and science seek out only single 
unifying theories of reason and science. Scholars have characterized 
modernism as espousing these single master or meta "narratives of truth. ,,35 
Modernists believe truth is a concept that is uncovered through progress. 
Modern forms and theories are considered part of progress or development 
within a linear conception ofhistory.36 
Postrnodernists reject articulating a single meaning or definition of truth 
or, in fact, any modernist concept. Skepticism is applied to the very 
meaning of words, even the word postrnodernism.37 The denial ofits own 
definition thereby creates a paradox: postmodernism's denial of the 
possibility of its own defmition while simultaneously defining itself as 
supra note 2, at 336 ("Postmodernism, then, is the rejection of this faith in rationalism, and a 
recognition that any argument, no matter how perfectly logical, is only as good as its 
presuppositions."); FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 15-28. 
3! See Jiirgen Habermas, Modernity Versus Postmodernity, in A POSTMODERN READER 91, 
91-92 (Joseph Natoli & Linda Hutcheon cds., 1993). 
32 See Stephen M. Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship and 
Judicial Practice (With an Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in Habeus Corpus 
Cases), 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1046, 1048 (1994). 
33 See FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 15-28; see generally Morley, supra note 30. 
34 See, e.g., Peter A. Alces & Cynthia V. Ward, Defending Truth, 78 TEX. L. REV. 493, 521-
22 (1999); see also Postmodemism, www.jahsonic.com/PostModernism.html (last visited Sept. 
27,2006). 
35 See JEAN FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REpORT ON 
KNOWLEDGE 34 (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984) (1979). 
36 See FELDMAN, supra note 7 at 15-28; see generally Morley, supra note 30. 
37 See Wicke supra note 14, at 456 (discussing the difficulty of defining postmodernism). 
Stephen Feldman specifically avoids defining postmodemism. FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 38, 
n.19. 
900 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [VoL 58:3 
such.38 It is the identification, exploration and celebration of such 
paradoxes which characterize postmodernism and make it such a challenge 
to the student of postmodemism and abhorrent to those who seek clarity, 
unity of meaning, and stability in the works being characterized as 
postmodem.39 
Products emerging from this theory-based definition of postmodemism 
are also labeled as postmodem.40 But these products, in order to be 
classified as postmodem, are not just dated from a certain time period, 
instead they must have certain characteristics that connect them to the 
underlying philosophy ofpostmodernism.41 
Some may ask, what is the point or utility of identifying those 
components of the profession that are or originated from postmodernism. 
38 See Feldman, supra note 32, at 1048 ("Hence, postmodemism immediately presents a 
paradox. Postmodernism exists and even structures its own reproduction, yet postmodernism 
denies the possibility of its own definition.") (footnote omitted). 
39 See Feldman, supra note 32, at 1048 ("Indeed, fuis paradox illustrates one recurrent aspect 
or fueme ofpostmodernism: the recognition, exploration, and even celebration of this existence of 
various paradoxes."). One core tenet ofpostmodernism is that the meaning of words and tcxts arc 
ncver fixed or stablc but instead are in a constant state of flux, thus, a word or text has multiple 
meanings. Similarly and more distrcssing to many in the legal profession, postmodcrnists see the 
concept of trufu as similarly not fixed or stable and fuus open to multiplc interpretations. See id. 
at 1048 ("According to postmodernists, the meaning of a text is nevcr grounded or stablc, and 
therefore one can always find multiple meanings or trufus."). A particularly vehemcnt brand of 
criticism has been leveled at postmodem reading of texts, particularly legal texts. See Goldberg, 
supra note 2, at 549-51. The very uncertainty raised by postmodcrni.sm is an anathema to the 
normative needs of the law as a societal regulator. See Donaldson, supra notc 2, at 344 ("[L]aw 
must not bc postmodernized, or it will cease to be law. Law is, by definition, about absolutes .... 
[P]ostmodcrism, once it is adopted into . legal analysis, quickly renders law impotent. Oncc 
relativism is accepted into law, there is no basis on which to justify legal prohibition or action."). 
40 See Balkin, supra note 23, at 1969. 
id. Othcr disciplines havc used fue tcrm "postmodem" to label a movement or style 
wifuin their disciplinc. For an excellent survey of postmodemism's emergence in various fields 
see Hans Bertens, The Postmodern Weltanschauung and Its Relation to Modernism: An 
Introductory Survey, in A POSTMODERN READER 25, 35-42 (Joseph Natoli & Linda Hutcheon 
cds., 1993). Architecture was one of fue first profcssions to use such a label. Comparisons 
between law and architecture are common by legal scholars. For a recent example, see JILL J. 
RAMS FIELD, THE LAW AS ARCHITECTURE: BUILDING LEGAL DOCUMENTS xvii (West 2000); see 
also John Nivala, The Architecture of a Lawyer's Operation: Learning from Frank Lloyd Wright, 
201. LEGAL PROF. 99, 99 (1996). Certain types of paintings, sculptures, fashion and music are 
labeled postmodem. See Examples of "The Post-Modern in Everyday Life," available at 
http://www.gcorgetown.edulfaculty/irvinemJtcchnocultureipomoexamplcs.html (last visited Oct. 
26,2006). 
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Indeed, Professor Stephen M. Feldman argues that postmodern legal 
scholars and their scholarship are not particularly useful to judges and 
practicing attorneys who "primarily want normative arguments to apply 
instrumentally to their practices.,,42 He states that postmodern scholars 
detach themselves from the practical aspects of the law and mystify readers 
with "impenetrable terminology.,,43 
I disagree. Postrnodernism has become such a standard part of modem 
discourse that to ignore or write-off postrnodern scholars and 
postrnodernism in such a way is inappropriate for law professors as well as 
attorneys, judges and others in the legal profession.44 Postmodemism helps 
us understand the patterns of thought that are emerging in this technological 
era.45 It advances understanding ofthe law and jurisprudential theory for all 
in the legal profession.46 Indeed, it is a scholar's job to study and point out 
trends in his or her field, label those trends, and open a discourse on them.47 
To ignore or write-off postrnodernism would be to perform incomplete 
scholarship lacking in complete rigorous inquiry into the field oflaw.48 
42 See Feldman, supra note 32, at 1093. 
43 See id. Professor Feldman further argues postmodern scholars' "primary function [is] to 
deliver the goods by publishing articles." See id. at 1099. But then, like any good postmodern 
scholar, he complicates this reductiomst statement by arguing that the postmodernists play 
important roles in opening the legal community to "different voice scholars" (and then even this 
reductiomst statement, he argues, can be made more complicated). See id. at 1102-05. 
44 See id. at 1093, 1099, 1102-05. 
45 See Balkin, supra note 23, at 1968 ("Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the 
postmodern epoch as such is already upon us. Postmodernism is a cultural phenomenon that has 
already happened and that we are only becoming aware of now."); Donaldson, supra note 2, at 
344 ("Clearly postmodernism carmot be ignored. The questions it asks about law and the 
criticisms it makes are far too important to go unanswered. If law carmot find a way to engage 
and respond to postmodernism, people will soon have little use for it"); Feldman, supra note 1, at 
2370 ("Postmodern culture, in other words, permeates all a!>'Pects of our lives, including the 
writing of theory."); Litowitz, supra note 7, at 40 ("This 'postmodern turn' brought legal 
scholarship up to speed with the rest of the academy, where postmodernism was already well-
established in such diverse fields as philosophy, literary theory, sociology, geography, art, and 
political science."). See generally Feldman, supra note I (noting the attention postmodern debate 
has garnered among legal scholars); Litowitz, supra note 7. 
Balkin, supra note 23, at 1969; see also Todd,supra note 24, at 319. 
Robert R. Kuehn, A Normative Analysis of the Rights and Duties of Law Professors to 
Speak Out, 55 S.C. L. REv. 253, 254 (2003). 
Litowitz, supra note 7, at 46-49. European academics state postmodernism as a part of 
a working European constitution. See, e.g., Marc Glendening, Post-Modernism and the Silent 
Revolution, EUROPEAN J., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 8, 10, available at http://www.democracy-
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The postmodern paradox, which arises in any article addressing 
postmodernism, is that the act of defining postmodernism is anti-
postmodern because it is a reductionist and modernist act49 It is, however, 
this act of capturing and describing postmodernism that is useful for 
bridging the discourse between postmodern theory and the normative needs 
of the legal profession. 50 Such a bridge is needed in this age of 
postmodernity where the internet, globalization and rapidly changing 
technologies outstrip the normative boundaries of the law, and a more fluid 
paradigm is needed.S! Some argue the American Constitution is 
postmodern in its characterization as a "living document."s2 Some may also 
question the role of a theory such as postmodernism in a skills-based or 
practical class such as legal writing. The ancient Greeks often placed 
theory (theoria) and practice (praxis) as binary opposites.s3 Scholars 
historically have, and the legal academy particularly has, treated theoretical 
knowledge as superior to practical knowledge. 54 Since legal writing is 
considered a practical or skills-based course, it has suffered in the legal 
academy from this historical hierarchy. 55 This division between theory and 
practice, like the division between doctrine and skills, however, has come 
under criticism by contemporary scholars within and outside of the legal 
movement.co.uk!mainJpdf/MG%20Post-Mod.pdf; WENZEL NIKOLAI, IDEOLOGY AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE: THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION AS REFLECTION OF EUROPE'S 
EMERGENT POSTMODERNISM 7 (2005), available at 
http://www.pubchoicesoc.org/papers2005/Wenze1.pdf. 
49 See Feldman, supra note 32, at 1046-48; Conference on After Postmodernism, 
http://www.focusing.orglapm.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006) (stating "[w]hat postmodernism 
teaches is not new. Heraclitus said, 'You cannot step into the same river twice' and his student 
added, 'not even once, since there is no same river.' The ancient Eristics showed the unreliability 
oflogic alone."). 
50 See Feldman, supra note 32, at 1093 (indicating that judges and attorneys "primarily want 
nonnative arguments to apply instrumentally to their practices"). 
51 Some European aeademics see postmodernism as a component of a working European 
Union constitution. See, e.g., Glendening, supra note 48, at 10. 
52 See FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 188-198; see also NIKOLAl, supra note 48, at 7. 
53 See SlDt-.'EY 1. DOBRIN, CONSTRUCTING KNOWLEDGES: THE POLITICS OF THEORY-
BUILDING AND PEDAGOGY IN COMPOSITION 9 (1997). 
54 Indeed this may be an explanation for the denigration of legal writing within the legal 
academy. See David S. Romantz, The Truth About Cats and Dogs: Legal Writing Courses and the 
Law School Curriculum, 52 u. KAN. L. REv. 105, 115-16, 127-36 (2003). 
55 See id. 
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academy.56 Some scholars have argued that theory requires abstraction and 
is often divorced from reallife.57 But such an argument should not detract 
from the privilege given to theory; if theory is indeed impractical, its value 
in the legal academy should cause it to have less status compared to the 
practical components ofthe academy. 
Theory is given such privilege because theory, consciously or 
unconsciously, determines practice.58 And conversely, practice shapes 
theory.59 Similarly theory determines and influences pedagogy and vice 
versa. The two cannot be separated. The choice a teacher makes as to how 
she chooses to teach a class or structure an assignment is based on the 
theory she brings to the class.60 
Theories provide explanations for the way the world operates. In the 
physical sciences, theory provides explanations for the origins of the 
universe through the Big Bang theory or the development of human 
intelligence through evolution.61 In law, theory explains whether a contract 
will be found to be enforceable or whether a statement should be found 
defamatory. Similarly, in legal writing, theory explains how and what is 
taught in the first year of law school. 
56 See, e.g., LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL 
CONTINUUM, REpORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: 
NARROWING THE GAP 4-6 (1992); see also Suzanne Darrow-Kleinhaus, Incorporating Bar Pass 
Strategies into Routine Teaching Practices, 37 GONZ. L. REv. 17, 19-20 (2001) (stating legal 
educators should incorporate practical skills into their teaching methods). 
57 See DOBRIN, supra note 53, at 9; see also Jasper Nee!, Dichotomy, Consubstantiality, 
Technical Writing. Literary Theory: The Double Orthodox Curse, in COMPOSITION THEORY FOR 
THEPOSTMODERN CLASSROOM 16, 20--21 (Gary A. Olson & Sidney 1. Dobrin eds., 1994). 
58 DOBRIN, supra note 53, at 9-10. 
Practice cannot be separated from theory. And yet, we can talk about theory for 
theory's sake but not practice for practice's sake. Why? Because practice cannot exist 
without theory .... Even the most inexperienced teachers who may be completely 
unaware of the origins of their practice usc a pedagogy that was founded in some 
theory. 
Id. See also GERALD F. HESS & STEVEN FRIEDLAND, TECHNIQUES FOR TEACHING LAW 105 
(1999) ("Experiential learning integrates theory and practice by combining academic inquiry with 
real-life experience."). 
59 See DOBRIN, supra note 53, at 9. 
60 See id. at 9-10. 
61 See STEPHEN M. BARR, MODERN PHYSICS AND ANCIENT FAITH 33 (2003); MONROE W. 
STRICKBERGER, EVOLUTION 76 (3d ed. 2000). 
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In order to advance our understanding of what legal writing teachers 
perfonn in their classrooms, the role and contribution postmodernism has 
played in the teaching of legal writing must be acknowledged and 
appreciated. Denying or disparaging theory in general, or postmodernisrn 
in particular, does a disservice to the legal writing profession and the 
academy as a whole.62 
III. POSTMODERNISM IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY 
Postmodernism affected the legal writing classroom in part by affecting 
the legal academy as a whole. Professor Stephen Feldman in American 
Legal Thought from Premodernism to Postmodernism places 
postmodernism in the legal academy, in relation to modernism and 
premodernism.63 He argues that premodern jurisprudence, as found in the 
writings of jurists such as Blackstone, was based on natural law 
principles.64 Modern jurisprudents rejected these natural law principles in 
favor of rational, scientific, empirical and secular principles. Scholars such 
as Christopher Columbus Langdell and other legal scientists developed 
legal principles from the careful study of cases and used reasoning through 
upward induction to derive scientific fonnula that explained law; in contrast 
to the downward deductive reasoning of natural law.65 The Restatement 
treatises are most emblematic of legal modernism. Restatements derive 
supposedly objective, neutral, and ordered rules of law from the common 
law.66 Such a search for an orderly, monolithic articulation of the law is 
thoroughly modern.67 
62 See Michael R. Smith, The Next Frontier: Exploring the Substance of Legal Writing, 2 J. 
Assoc. LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 1, 22 (2004) (noting the role of legal writing to the 
profession and the academy). 
63 Professor Feldman argues that postmodernism needs to be understood relationally to 
modernism and premodernism. See FELD!vIAN, supra note 7, at 9; see also Litowitz, supra note 7, 
at 42-43. 
64Blackstone writes that "human laws are only declaratory of, and in subordination to [natural 
law principles]." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENtARIES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 9 VOLUME 
2 (1979). 
65FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 96-97; see also ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL 
EDUCA nON IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s 52-53 (1983). 
66 See FELDMAN supra note 7, at 111-12; G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and 
the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 1-2 (1997). 
67 See White, supra note 66, at 2. 
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While legal scientism and the Restatements are illustrative of 
modernism, scholars criticizing these movements are not necessarily 
postmodernists. Legal realists and scholars from the critical legal studies 
(CLS) movement are often very modernist in their philosophy.68 Both 
movements, while critiquing earlier jurisprudential theory, still ground their 
scholarship on modern aspirations of developing a single, unifYing theory 
of the law. Legal realists used economics and other social sciences as 
methods of study of the legal system. CLS scholars used Marxism and 
politics as the "metanarrative" to explain the functioning of the legal system 
and to work towards the progressive improvement of the legal system.69 
While the foundations of the legal realist and CLS movements are 
modernist, these movements formed a bridge to postmodern legal 
movements.70 These movements' examination of the connection between 
law and society sowed the seeds of the postmodern legal movement.7! 
Postmodern scholars "rejected the idea that law could be rendered coherent 
by a comprehensive legal theory."n This rejection of "large-scale, 
totalizing theories,,73 is manifested by skepticism of any claims by 
jurisprudents to qualities of neutrality, objectivity, internal consistency and 
the truth. 74 
68 See FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 132. 
69 See id. Minda points out that later "second generation" CLS scholars were postmodernists. 
See MINDA, supra note 7, at 116. 
70 Some view the legal realists as the fIrst postmodcm legal scholars. From the legal realist 
movement came "Plain English" advocates who argued the main function of legal language is to 
obscure and conceal the lack of consistency and imperfections of the law. Postmodern scholars 
built on the legal realists' work, keeping the Plain English movement's critique of modernist legal 
discourse but rejecting the Plain English movement's solution as too simplistic and reductive (or 
too modernist). Legal language is more complex, dynamic and fluid to be simply fixed by the 
imposition of plain language. See Douglas Litowitz, Legal Writing: Its Nature, Limits, and 
Dangers, 49 MERCERL. REv. 709, 716 (1998). 
71 See Christopher L. Sagers, Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at 
Century's End, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1927,1931 (1997) (book review). 
72 See MINDA, supra note 7, at 77. 
73 See id. at 224 (quoting COSTA DOUZINAS ET AL., POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW 
OF TEXTS lNTHE TEXTS OF LAW (1991». 
74 See Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought: From Langdell and 
Holmes to Posner and Schlag, 28 IND. L. REv. 353, 354 (1995). 
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Many argue that the lack of certainty and fragmentation of 
postmodernism is antithetical to the normative needs of the law.75 The very 
idea behind a written law is to create certainty and clarity in our relations 
with others and the State.76 As a result of these normative needs, many 
scholars have called postmodernism dangerous or irrelevant to the law or 
dead in terms of its applicability to law. 77 
On one level, the critics of postmodernism are correct. In its purest 
form, postmodernism can lead to a form of chaotic nihilism that serves little 
practical use to the legal academy.78 If all attempts to create meaning, 
search for unifying truths and rules of behavior, and other quests that are 
essential to a meaningful legal system are deemed futile, then legal 
scholarship and the legal system itself becomes meaningless.79 
Professor Feldman has identified this type of nihilism and the 
postmodern theorists who put forward this rather pessimistic viewpoint as 
7S See MINDA, supra note 7, at 208; see also Feldman, supra note 32, at 1093 (indicating 
judges and attorneys "primarily want nonnative arguments to apply instrumentally to their 
practices"). 
76 See MARCEL PLAJ>.,[OL, TRArrtl ELl~,MENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 61 (La, State Law Inst 
trans" 12th ed. 1939) (noting that the virtues of written law are "precision, certainty, fixity, and 
above all unity"); see generally Andrei Mannor, The Nature of Law, THE STAN, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHIL., May 2001, available at http://plato.stanford,edulentries/lawphil-nature/ ("Law, however, 
is also a nonnative social practice: it purports to guide human behavior, giving rise to reasons for 
action,"). 
Eichhorn, supra note 2, at 141 ("Writing may indeed be a dangerous supplement in the 
law school curriculum."); Feldman, supra note I, at 2357 ("'[P]ostrnodernism has become an 
academic joke even before the dawn of the millennium. ", (citing WEST, supra note 4, at 204»; 
Pavela, supra note 6, at 1 02 (declaring "postrnodemism as we used to know it is dead"). 
78 See Feldman, supra note 1, at 2373-74 ("[Postrnodemism] encompasses a belief in radical 
relativism .... There is no way to adjudicate among competing claims to truth and knowledge. 
When it comes to textual interpretation, anything goes."); Robert Justin Lipkin, Can American 
Constitutional Law Be Postmodern?, 42 BUFF. L. REv. 317, 332, 334 (1994) ("[A] possible 
articulation[J ofpostrnodernity's positive thesis [is] ... [n]ihilism" and "nihilism leaves one in a 
state of incomprehension concerning meaning, knowledge and value."); Moran, supra note 5, at 
157 ("[T]he use of postrnodern theory in contemporary legal scholarship has accomplished very 
little."). 
79 See Donaldson, supra note 2, at 344-45 ("What postrnodernism does is deprive us of the 
ability to detennine what right and wrong are, and once this is done, law is without meaning or 
purpose."); Moran, supra note 5, at 159 ("[I]f carried to an extreme, postrnodern principles 
threaten to undennine the Western legal system in such a way that return will become 
unattainable."). 
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the "antimodernist" who takes postmodernism to an extreme. so There is 
another type of postmodern theorist who takes a more pragmatic approach 
to postmodernism whom Professor Feldman labels "metamodernists."Sl 
Metamodernists are moderate postmodernists who use the tools of 
postmodernism for a better understanding of the world. Postmodernism can 
be a liberating construction that allows for a bridge between the rigidity and 
normalization of modernity and the fluidity and flux of postmodernity. 
Postmodernism does not need to be reduced to nihilism nor must it 
eliminate the ethical and moral foundations produced under modernism.s2 
Instead, postrnodernism grants a license for flexibility and multiplicity. It 
removes the necessity of privileging one position over another and can 
allow multiple positions and interpretations to exist simultaneously. 
Indeed the antimodernist postmodernists who espouse a total rejection 
of modernism have arguably fallen into a modernist trap. A complete 
rejection of modernism is itself a modernist act. 83 Postmodernism, unlike 
modernism, does not supplant those theories that have preceded it84 but, 
instead, supplements them.85 Postmodernism recognizes the value and 
existence of modem and traditional norms and needs at the same time as 
acknowledging the uncertainty and fluidity of the high tech age.86 
It is in the spirit of the metamodernists or those who see postmodernism 
as a supplement to our modernist (and traditionalist) work that this Article 
80 Feldman, supra note I, at 2374; see also Lipkin, supra note 78, at 332-38. 
81 See Feldman, supra note I, at 2374; see also Donaldson, supra note 2, at 336, 345 ("A 
second way to understand postmodernism is as a methodology, a way of reading texts and 
interpreting history using a cluster of tools .... What is needed is a sensible middle ground, a 
worldview which can contain both grand vision and a cautious skepticism."); Moran, supra note 
5, at 159. 
82 See Donaldson, supra note 2, at 345 (arguing postmodernism, as a critique of modernism 
"helps us to recognize our limitations" but the dangers of postmoderninity, when it goes too far, 
"crosses the line from humility to pointless self abasement"); see also Fayaz Chagani, 
Postmodernism: Rearranging the Furniture of the Universe (1998), available at 
http://www.geocities.comlathens/agoral9095!postmodernism.html. 
83 See Feldman, supra note I, at 2367 ("[P]ostmodernists do not rely on binary oppositions."). 
See also Chagani, supra note 82 ("Many have complained that postmodernism falls into nihilism 
. . .. Postmodernists... simply remove the necessity of foundations and the necessity of 
choosing one position over another, allowing us the freedom to construct our own positions."). 
84Modernism sees itself as having replaced or supplanted traditionalism and tribalism. See 
Feldman, supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
85 See Donaldson, supra note 2, at 335; Eichhorn, supra note 2, at 141. 
36 See Litowitz, supra note 7, at 43-44. 
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is written and argues that postmodernism has infonned the legal writing 
classroom in the American law schooL By identifying and labeling the 
work or parts of the work of legal writing professionals. as postmodem, 
understanding, communication, and insight can be gained into the place of 
legal writing in the legal academy. Postmodernism can help explain the 
manner in which legal writing is taught and why there is a "dividing line" 
between legal writing and the rest of the academy.87 Furthermore, an 
examination of postmodernism's effect on legal writing demonstrates that 
postmodernism is indeed alive and well in the legal writing academy. 
IV. THE LEGAL WRITING PROFESSION AND POSTMODERNISM' S 
ATTRIBUTES 
Scholars who define postmodernism attribute certain characteristics and 
themes to the tenn.88 Since postmodernism is difficult to define or label, 
the identification of characteristics and themes of postmodernism helps 
identify a subject's postmodern traits. 89 An examination of the 
characteristics associated with postmodernism demonstrates how the legal 
writing profession maintains postmodern attributes and that postmodernism 
is intimately integrated into the teaching oflegal writing. 
Professor Feldman identifies eight themes of postmodernism found in 
American legal thought that help define what constitutes postmodernism in 
the legal academy. He characterizes postmodernism as (1) anti~ 
foundationalist and anti-essentialist; (2) challenging certainty, edifices and 
boundaries; (3) involving paradoxes;90 (4) concerned with power, especially 
linguistic and discursive power; (5) emphasizing social construction of the 
self (as opposed to an independent or autonomous self); (6) self-reflexive or 
87 See Eichhorn, supra note 2, at 114-17; see also Amy E. Sloan, Erasing Lines: Integrating 
the Law School Curriculum, 1 1. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 3, 3 (2002). 
88 See FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 38-44; see also Litowitz. supra note 7, at 41. 
89These scholars readily identifY the irony of the modernist act in which they engage when 
labeling a subject postmodem or seek to evade such an act. See FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 38. 
90 Scholars of postmodemism have identified paradoxes and contradictions about 
postmodernism itself: (1) it is anti-theory which is essentially a theory; (2) it stresses the irrational 
but instruments of reason a freely employed within the movement; (3) it emphasis on the marginal 
is an evaluative emphasis; (4) it stresses intertextuality but often treats texts in isolation (e.g., 
deconstruction vs. internet intertextuality); (5) by rejecting modem criteria for assessing theory, it 
cannot argue there are no valid criteria for jUdging. See PAULINE MARIE ROSENAU, POST-
MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: INSIGHTS, INROADS, AND INTRUSIONS (1991). 
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self-referential; (7) ironic; and (8) politically ambivalent (and even 
neoconservative).91 
I would add to these eight characteristics three other characteristics 
identified by other scholars of postmodemism: (1) celebrating 
fragmentation, uncertainty and chaos;92 (2) connection to everyday 
consumerism and consumer transactions;93 and (3) utilizing and 
intertwining high-technology and the Internet with things low-tech and 
primitive.94 
Examining these themes and characteristics in relation to the work of 
legal writing professionals demonstrates the postmodem bent of the 
profession. The legal writing classroom can be characterized as anti-
foundationalist and anti-essentialist because it challenges the 
91 See FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 38-44. 
92The scholar Hans Bertens identifies "ontological uncertainty" as a "central concept of 
postmodernisrn." See BERTENS, supra note 11, at 203. Professor Feldman captures this 
characteristic, somewhat, in his first identified theme, "antifoundationalist and anti-essentialist," 
but its importance makes it deserving as a characteristic in its own right. See Feldman, supra note 
32, at 1080. 
9J Barbara Stark identifies three characteristics of postmodernism that she applies to 
international law. Barbara Stark, Women and Globalization: The Failure and Postmodern 
Possibilities of International Law, 33 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503, 546 (2000). First is its 
fragmentary and chaotic condition. Id. Second is its "incredulity toward metanarratives." Id. 
Third, it is not abstract but "rooted in daily life." Id. 
94Professor Martin Irvine on his web site charts out key characteristics of modernism and 
postmodemism. Martin Irvine, "The Postmodern," "Postmodernism," "Postmodernity": 
Approaches to Po-Mo (1998), bttp:!!www.georgetown.edulirvinemjlteclmoculture!pomo.html. 
His list is helpful in seeing how postmodernism is a reaction to and rejection of modemism. Id. 
The key characteristics of postmodemism shape my defmition of what can be considered or 
labeled a ''postmodem law." Id. Among the characteristics he lists arc: (1) rejection of master 
narratives in favor of local narratives and countennyths; (2) "rejection of totalizing theory" and 
"pursuit of localizing and contingent theories"; (3) "social and cultural pluralism, disunity"; (4) 
"skepticism of progress"; (5) "sense of fragmentation and de-centered self, multiple, conflicting 
identities"; (6) "subverted order, loss of centralized control, fragmentation"; (7) "trust and 
investment in micro-politics", "institutional power struggles" (8) "rhizome! surface tropes"; (9) 
use ofteclmology, mix of text and image, interactive, thc internet; (10) "hyper-reality, images and 
texts with no prior 'original"'; (11) "disruption of the dominance of high culture by popular 
culture; mixing of popular and high cultures"; (12) "demassified culture"; (13) "infonnation 
management, just-in-time knowledge, the web"; (14) "interactive"; (15) "dispersal, 
dissemination, networked, distributed knowledge"; (16) "indctenninancy, contingency"; (17) 
"play, irony, challenge to official seriousness"; (18) "hybridity," "intertextuality," combined 
genres; (19) "mixing of organic and inorganic, human and machine"; and (20) "hypenncdia as 
transcendence of physical limits of print media; the Web or Net as infonnation system." Id. 
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foundationalist and essentialist nature of the doctrinal classes in the rest of 
the legal academy-particularly first year classes. In classes, other than 
legal writing, the law is categorized, essentialized, and modernist labels are 
attached: tort, contracts, property, constitutional, criminal and civil 
procedure issues are parsed out in each class, and the black letter principles 
are sought, outlined, studied and applied in the final exam. In most legal 
writing classes, these subjects are all jumbled together. Legal writing 
classes mimic real life; students deal with facts that do not come in a bound 
textbook and announce the word "Torts" or "Contracts" on the cover. 
Instead students are given fact patterns that require an understanding and 
critique of the boundaries imposed by normal classifications of the law. 
This practical approach found in the writing classroom challenges the 
boundaries and edifices erected in the other doctrinal classrooms which 
artificially isolate legal doctrine in ways not encountered in legal practice.95 
Certainly, a legal writing class that uses a practice approach to teaching 
writing also reinforces these very modernist boundaries by having the 
students identify the categories of law from the facts. 96 But such an 
exercise has the effect of making the student aware of the artifice and 
limitations of these very boundaries. This self-reflective act is 
postrnodern.97 Students, by participating in the act of labeling and directly 
working with real facts, gain an understanding of the linguistic and 
discursive power involved in calling a certain act either a tort, a contract or 
a crime. 
The emphasis found in legal writing classes on citation and the 
acknowledgment of sources found in the act of labeling a legal argument is 
also consistent with postmodernism's emphasis on a social construction of 
ideas rather than autonomous or independent argument,98 Students in a 
95 Not all doctrinal classes function in the way I characterize here. Some professors use a 
problem method for teaching which focuses on facts. Other professors and law schools approach 
some doctrinal classes in an inter-disciplinary manner, combining classes such as torts and 
contracts. See Steve Sheppard, An Introductory History of Law in the Lecture Hall, in THE 
HISTORY OFLEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1,7-71 (Steve Sheppard ed., 1999); see 
also Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, The Socratic Method-Problem Method Dichotomy: The Debate 
Over Teaching Methods Continues, 1998 BYU EDUC. &L.J. 1,7 & nn.36-37 (1998). 
96 See Romantz, supra note 10, at 146; see generally Jo Anne Durako et al., From Product to 
Process: Evolution of a Legal Writing Program, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 719 (1997) (overviewing 
legal writing). 
97 See FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 38-44. 
98 See Id.; see also Schanck, supra note 9, at 2508-09. 
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legal writing class are urged to ground their arguments in statutes, 
precedent and learned treatises rather than original theories.99 An opinion is 
given greater weight and validity if it has reference to its origins. An 
argument that is purely original and without reference to other sources is 
suspect, 100 
As argued in detail below, the legal writing class is quite postmodem 
because it is entangled in postmodem paradoxes and acrobatics that make 
the class different from its more modernist doctrinal counterparts. WI 
Students are told in legal writing assignments that there may be not one 
correct or right answer but multiple arguments that should be made. 102 
Students use high technology (computers) and basic implements (pencil and 
paper) to produce and engage in the c1assroom.103 The legal writing class, 
while an academic enterprise of a high theoretical level-addressing the 
development of language and thought-is the most practical and consumer-
99See MICHAEL D. MCRRr,\Y & CHRlSTY H. DESANCTIS, LEGAL RESEARCH & WRlTING: 
OBJECTIVE LEGAL WRlTING AND ANALYSIS 163 (2006). 
100 See Kris Franklin, The Rhetorics of Legal Authority Constructing Authoritativeness, the 
"Ellen Effect." and the Example of Sodomy Law, 33 RFTGERS L.J. 49, 49 (2001) ("Legal citations 
construct legal authority. Legal authority, in turn, constructs law. Thus, the question of what is 
cited in a judicial opinion ... fundamentally shapes what we understand to be American law."); 
see also Joel R. Cornwell, Languages of a Divided Kingdom: Logic and Literacy in the Writing 
Curriculum, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 49, 56 (2000) ("Students are taught that the strength of a 
legal assertion lies in its familiarity; original ideas are by nature idiosyncratic and 
untrustworthy."); J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Rarnsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 
WASH. L. REv. 35, 59 (1994) ("[1']0 learn legal writing is to leam how to write within the 
conventions and practices of a particular professional group more than it is to write original ideas . 
. . . "). But see Carol McCrehan Parker, Writing Throughout the Curriculum: Why Law Schools 
Need It and How to Achieve It, 76 NEB. L. REv. 561, 597 (1997) ("[A] law school writing 
curriculum should provide students the opportunity to 'think on paper' ... to fOlmulate and 
express original ideas concerning issues of importance to the students and to society."). 
101See discussion infra Part V; Eichhorn, supra note 2, at 141 ("[Wlriting is dangerous 
because it highlights what is not present in the traditional doctrinal course."). 
102See e.g., Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. REv. I, 12 (1990) 
("The reader's experience will attest that in an extremely high percentage of situations ... no 
genuinely exceptional circumstance intervenes .... [But,] [s]omewhat unusual circumstances may 
arise when the application of the directive and the manner in which Sam should respond to it are 
unclear."). Students need to construct arguments and counterarguments. This is not to say that 
there are not correct answers in the law. Id. 
103 See Craig T. Smith, Practices and Procedures Synergy and Synthesis: Teaming "Socratic 
Method" with Computers and Data Projectors to Teach SyntheSiS to Beginning Law Students, 7 
LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRlTING INST. 113, 123-26 (2001), available at 7 Legal Writing 13 
(LEXIS). 
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oriented, from the student as consumer point of view, of the fIrst year 
classes. 
In addition to the postmodern characteristics found in the legal writing 
classroom, the legal writing profession, . as a movement, also has 
postmodem characteristics. Its challenge to the boundaries of legal 
education and the standard curriculum has been signifIcant. Legal writing 
has transformed the legal academy (most certainly the fIrst year of legal 
studies) substantially over the past twenty years and continues to work to 
erase the lines between skills and doctrinal instruction in the academy.l04 
The movement has been self-reflective in its well-organized and 
faithfully attended conferences, numerous publications in its own 
established journals and immeasurable postings on computer listservs all 
analyzing where the profession has been and where it is going. 105 While the 
legal writing professionals are well organized, the movement is politically 
ambivalent; indeed the legal writing course is not necessarily associated 
with a right or left political orientation. In fact, established legal writing 
programs can be found in law schools that have both right and left political 
reputations. 106 
The legal writing movement is also not monolithic and is generally 
antifoundationist in its overall orientation. There is no single model for the 
teaching of legal writing to be found in American law schools, and the 
104 See Amy E. Sloan, Erasing Lines: Integrating the Law School Curriculum, 1 J. ASS'N 
LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 3,3 (2002), available at 1 JALWD 3 (Westlaw). 
105 See Jo Anne Dumko, A Snapshot of Writing Programs at the Millennium, 6 LEGAL 
WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 95,98-100 (2000), available at 6 Legal Writing 95 (LEXIS) 
(discovering results of a survey taken of legal writing programs); Jan M. Levine, Legal Research 
and Writing: "What Schools Are Doing, and Who Is Doing the Teaching, 7 SCRIBES J. LEGAL 
WRITING 51, 52 (2000) ("This article shows who is teaching legal writing at the tum of the 
century, and which law schools have programs that reflect either sound investment in writing 
abilities of future la>v),ers of shortsighted penury."); Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing in the 
Twenty-First Century: The First Images, 1 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 123, 123-
24 (1991), available at I LEGWRIT 123 (Westlaw); Smith, supra note 62, at 11-20, available at 
2 JALWD I (Westlaw). 
!06 The Princeton Review Best Law Schools 2005 Edition indicates that Ave Marie Law 
School, Bringham Young University, and Regent are all considered politically oriented to the right 
and ODC, CUNY, and Northeastern are considered left-leaning, and yet all of these schools have 
established legal writing programs. See ERIC OWENS ET AL., THE PRINCETO~ REVIEW: 117 BEST 
LAW SCHOOLS 66, 74, 138, 150,301 (2005 ed.); see also Karen Dybis, Is Your Law School Too 
Liberal?, THE NAT'L JURIST, Feb. 2006, at 26, 27, available at 
http://www.stthomas.eduilaw/in_the_news/is_youdawschooUoo_liberal.pdf. 
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staffing oflegal writing programs varies wide1y.lo7 While some in the legal 
writing profession have strong opinions as to how legal writing programs 
should be run and staffed,108 there is not consensus on these issues. 109 
Often, the movement is ironic and even celebratory about its situation 
and position in the academy. The use of irony and humor pervade the titles 
and subjects oflegal writing conference presentations11O and articles,lll and 
an underlying spirit of celebration pervades the movement. The 
postmodern characteristics of legal writing and the movement itself, 
particularly its history of marginalization in the academy-its 
fragmentation and variety of approaches, would make some believe the 
profession would be mired in self-pity or cynicism. But paradoxically, it is 
its outsider status and other postmodern characteristics which give the legal 
writing movement its celebratory spirit and sense of community. 
The rise of the legal writing community coincides with the influx of a 
new breed of student. This new type of student has been called "Generation 
107 Association of Legal Writing Directors, 2006 Survey Results (2006), available at 
http://www.alwd.org (follow "ALWD/LWI SUlVey" hyperlink; then follow "2006 ALWDILWI 
Survey Report" hyperlink); see Durako, supra note 105, at 96; Levine, supra note 105, at 60-78 
(displaying charts of schools differences); Ramsfield, supra note 105, at 126-27; see also Terrill 
Pollman & Judith M. Stinson, Irlqfarc! Surveying the Language C?f Legal Writing, 56 ME L. REv. 
239,254-55 (2004) (referring to diversity of terminology used in the teaching oflegal writing). 
Parker, supra note 100, at 563--64 (discussing new standards in legal writing); see 
also Maureen Arrigo-Ward, How to Please Most C?f the People Most of the Time: Directing (or 
Teaching in) a First-Year Legal Writing Program, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 557, 564-71, 571-74 
(1995) (describing strategies to staff and manage legal writing programs); Levine, supra note 
105, at 59; Jan M. Levine, "You Can't Please Everyone, So You'd Better Please Yourself.' " 
Directing (or Teaching in) a First-Year Legal Writing Program, 29 VAL. U. L. REv. 611, 624-30 
(1995); Ramsfield, supra note 105, at 129-31. 
109 See Ramsfield, supra note 105, at 152-54. The Author has e-maillistselV postings from 
legal writing professionals supporting this point whieh are on file ,,'lth the author with identifying 
information removed to protect confidentiality. 
110 See generally LEGAL WRITING INSTITUTE, 2006 CONFERENCE BROCHURE (2006), 
http://www.lwionline.org/activities/2006confcrencebrochure.pdf (identifying some witty 
conference titles like James B. Levy's and Anne Bobbins' Emotion Granted-The Pedagogy of 
Emotion in Legal Advocacy; Terri LeClercq's and Diana Abdo's, Gerunds, Infinitives, and 
Set-ups, Oh No! Composition Vocabulary for Creatures You'll Uncover in the Abyss of One-L 
Memos; Kristen K. Robbins' They're a Little Bit Plato, We're a Little Bit Aristotle: 
Understanding the Schism Between Doctrinal and Legal Writing Faculty). 
III See e.g., Mary Beth Beazley "Riddikulus!": Tenure-Track Legal-Writing Faculty and the 
Boggart in the Wardrobe, 7 SCRIBES 1. LEGAL WRITING 79,79 (1998-2000) (using Harry Potter 
motifs in a poignant criticism of the legal academy's denigration of the legal writing profession). 
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X."l12 This generation of students enters law school with a different 
perspective on the law from their forbearers. 113 Generation X has been 
described rather derogatorily as slackers, arrogant, disloyal and having short 
attention spans. 114 More positive attributes bestowed on Generation X are 
independent, technologically literate, '" ambitious,' 'entrepreneurial,' and 
'pragmatic' to the point of engaging in 'situational ethics. ",115 Whether 
these descriptions are accurate or fair is debatable, but they do seem to have 
a "kernel of truth" 116 since the influence of technology, politics, and media 
necessarily change the character of students from one generation to the 
next. Legal writing teachers directly engage in the challenges of teaching to 
the postrnodern attributes of Generation X.I17 Legal writing teachers use a 
variety of teaching methods which can engage the attention and interests of 
these students. Many legal writing teachers use PowerPoint, web pages, 
email andcomputerexercisesasteachingtools.118 The practical aspects of 
legal writing combined with its hands-on engagement, use of one-on-one 
112 There is a new label for some of the most recent students entering universities today: 
Generation M. See DONALD F. ROBERTS ET AL., GENERATION M: MEDIA iN THE LIVES OF 8-18 
YEAR OLDS (2005), available at http://www.kff.org/entmedia/7251.cfm(FullReport).This label 
applies to media saturated and tech-savvy children who have different leaming styles from earlier 
generations. Id. 
113 Some have even labeled Generation X "the postmodern generation." See PETER SACKS, 
GENERATION X GOES TO COLLEGE: AN EYE-OPENING ACCOUNT OF TEACHING IN POSTMODERN 
AMERICA 110 (1996). 
114 See Margot Hornblower, Great Xpectations: Slackers? Hardly. The So-Called Generation 
X Turns Out to be Full of Go-Getters Who Are Just Doing It-But Their Way, TIME, June 9,1997, 
at 58-62, available at 1997 WLNR 5538088 (Westlaw); see also Douglas L. Keene & Rita R.. 
Handrich, Keene Trial Consulting, Jurors for the Next 50 Years: Generation X, in FEBRUARY, 
2002 ATLA WINTER CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS ADVOCACY TRACK: JURY 
RESEARCH 63, 63 (Ass'n Trial Law. Am. 2002), available at Winter2002ATLA-CLE 63 
(Westlaw). 
115 See Hornblower, supra note 114, at 58-62. 
116 See Tracy L. McGaugh, Generation X in Law School: The Dying of the Light or the Dawn 
of a New Day?, 9 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 119, 123 (2003), available at 9 Legal 
Writing 119 (LEXIS). 
117 See id.; see also Jennifer Jolly·Ryan, Coordinating a Legal Writing Program with the 
Help of a Course Webpage: Help for Reluctant Leaders and the TechnolOgically-Challenged 
Professor, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 479, 491-92 (2004) (using web pages to connect to students). 
11B See, e.g., Maria Perez Crist, Technology in the LRW Curriculum-High Tech, Low Tech, 
or No Tech, 5 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 93,98-99 (1999), available at 5 Legal 
Writing 93 (LEXIS). 
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and small group exercises meet the learning needs of students in the 
postmodem era.lI9 
Finally, the postmodern condition of the real world found outside of the 
law school academy affects and bestows a postmodern bent to legal writing. 
The legal writing course is considered the most real world course in a 
student's first year of law school and, perhaps, of the student's entire law 
school career. The legal writing course tries to mimic the conditions and 
settings a student will face when writing in a real law practice setting. 120 
Indeed, most legal writing professors have had legal practice experience 
prior to entering the legal writing profession. In this post-modern era, the 
real world is fragmented, uncertain, diverse, rapidly changing, imbued with 
complex high-technology and archaic tradition, secular rationalism and 
religious fundamentalism, paradox, irony and mass consumerism. The 
postmodern characteristics of legal writing classes simply mirror the 
postmodern characteristics of modem society reinforcing the idea that the 
legal writing class is the most real world of all law school classes. 
V. POSTMODERN THEORY IN THE LEGAL WRITING CLASSROOM 
The legal writing classroom has attributes of postmodernism that 
demonstrate postmodernism's infiltration into the discipline. But the area 
where postmodernism has most influenced the legal writing classroom is in 
the theory and pedagogy of legal writing. 
While postmodernism has affected the teaching of writing and the legal 
academy in general, at least in terms of scholarship, it has not had much 
overt effect on most law school classrooms and the pedagogy in doctrinal 
classes. Most doctrinal law classes are taught in a modernist paradigm little 
changed from the pedagogical practices introduced by Christopher Langdell 
119 See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Inglehart et aI., From Cooperative Learning to Collaborative 
Writing in the Legal Writing Classroom, 9 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WruTING INST. 185, 198 
(2003), available at 9 Legal Writing 185 (LEXIS) ("[S]tudents cannot fully learn legal research, 
analysis, and writing by listening passively to lectures .... [S]tudents will fully internalize these 
important legal skills only with repeated practice on their own. Accordingly, many of us have 
replaced more and more of our lecturing with active learning activities."). 
120 See Pamela Lysaght & Cristina D. Lockwood, Writing-Across-the-Law-School 
Curriculum: Theoretical Justifications. Curricular implicatiOns, 2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WruTING 
DIRECTORS 73, 105 (2004), available at 2 JAL WD 73 (Westlaw); see also Kenneth D. Chestek, 
Reality Programming, Meets LRW: The Moot Case Approach to Teaching in the First Year, 38 
GONZ. L. REV. 57, 59 (2003). 
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at Harvard Law School in 1870.121 The typical law school classroom has 
the professor at the center either lecturing or leading a discussion through 
the psuedo-socratic method associated with the case method of teaching. 122 
The professor is seen as holding the truth or core knowledge about the 
subject and students are tested at the end of the semester using exams where 
formalism and black letter law are expected to be mechanically applied to 
limited fact patterns. 123 
The legal writing classroom uses a different paradigm.124 The students, 
rather than the professor, are often the center of classroom activities. 125 The 
121 The case method is "the predominant mode of law school instruction," despite 
longstanding criticism. Paul L. Caron, Back to the Future: Teaching Law Through Stories, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 405, 406 (2002) (citations omitted). See David D. Gamer, The Continuing Vitality of 
the Case Method in the Twenty-First Century, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 307, 321~31 (2000); 
Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. the Case Method: A Marvelous Adventure in Which 
Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraj, 34 CAL. W. L. REv. 351, 351 (1998) ("For over a century, 
the 'case method' of instruction ... has been the predominant mode of law school instruction."); 
see also Orin S. Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard, 78 NEB. L. REV. 113, 118-· 
22 (1999) (examining critiques of the case method). 
122 See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 591, 593 (1982); Philip C. Kissam, The Ideology of the Case Method/Final Examination 
Law School, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 137, 150 (2001). Christopher Columbus Langdell introduced his 
method at Harvard Law School in 1870. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL 
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850's TO THE 1980's 36 (1983). It has been pointed out that 
the Socratic method is more myth than reality in contemporary law schools. See also Ruta K. 
Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of Traditional Law School Methodology in the 
21st CentUlY, 27 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 449, 475~76, 489 (1996) (calling for an adoption of the 
traditional Langdellian Method to contemporary needs). 
123 See Kissam, supra note 122, at 153; see also Philip C. Kissam, Law School Examinations, 
42 VAND. L. REv. 433, 437-38 (1989); Romantz, supra note 10, at 108-36; Stropus, supra note 
122, at 485. 
124 David Romantz argues both doctrinal and legal '.¥Titing classrooms seek to achieve the 
same pedagogical goals of teaching critical thinking skills, though he does indicate the 
methodology is different. See Romantz, supra note 10, at 107. 
125 See Linda L. Berger, A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The Legal Writing Teacher as Reader 
and Writer, 6 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 57, 73 (2000), available at 6 Legal 
Writing 57 (LEXIS) ("[T]he teacher must look to ... his students for a new approach to which he 
can make a tentative commitment."); Robin Boyle, Bringing Learning-Style Instructional 
Strategies to Law Schools: You Be the Judge!, in PRACTICAL ApPROACHES TO USING LEARNING 
STYLES.N HIGHER EDUCATION 155, 165 (Rita Dunn & Shirley A. Griggs eds., 2000) (concluding 
"that straight lecture, the case method, and the Socratic method are not effective instructional 
strategies for significant percentages" of her legal writing students due to the diversity of learning-
style preferences among them); J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A 
Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REv. 35,66 (1994). 
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difference in paradigms can be attributed to the adoption of the process 
method of writing instruction, a method which came from 
postmodernism.126 
Rhetoric and composition studies, which have guided legal writing 
teaching and theory,127 have been profoundly affected by postmodern 
theory but in a manner that differs from postmodernism's effect on legal 
writing. Rhetoric and composition studies have a long history, dating back 
to ancient Athenic and Roman writing instruction described by Quintilian, 
far predating any formal school of legal writing. 128 These classical roots 
formed the foundation of modern rhetoric in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.129 Early classical rhetoricians saw language as fixed 
and "reporting objectively, rather than interpreting.,,130 Consistent with 
modernism's search for order and rational thought, early rhetorical studies 
and writing instruction were concerned with writing as a discrete skill. The 
language process was seen to be static and the goal of rhetoricians was to 
find universal, unifying meaning to words and writing. l3l Literary theorists 
similarly sought the objective, singular interpretation of an author's 
intention in a piece of writing. The roots of the exclusion of composition 
and writing as a scholarly discipline can be attributed to this early view of 
126 See FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 38-44. 
127 See Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of 
Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUe. 155, 155 (1999); see also Elizabeth 
Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL 
L. REv. 163, 174-79 (1993); Jessie C. Grearson, Teaching the Transitions, 4 LEGAL WRITmG: J. 
LEGAL WRITING INST., 57, 62-{)4 (1998), available at 4 LEGWRIT 57 (Westlaw); Teresa 
Godwin Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 Sw. LJ. 1089, 1094-98 (1986); Rideout & 
Ramsfield, supra note 100, at 51-56. 
128 See Roman Writing Instruction As Described by Quintilian, in A SHORT HISTORY OF 
WRITIl'iG INSTRUCTION: FROM ANCIENT GREECE TO TWENTIETH CENTURY A,\1ERICA 19,20-29 
(James J. Murphy ed., 1990); see also KATHLEEN E. WELCH, Writing Instruction in Ancient 
Athens After 450 B.C., in HISTORY OF WRITmG INSTRUCTION: FROM ANCIENT GREECE TO 
TwENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 1,2-5 (James 1. Murphy ed., \990); Eichhorn, supra note 2, at 
106-07. 
129Winifred Byran Horner, Writing Instruction in Great Britain: Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries, in SHORT HISTORY OF WRITING INSTRUCTION: FROM ANCIENT GREECE TO 
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA, supra note 128, at 121-24. 
l3oTeni1l Pollman, Building a Tower of Babel or Building a Disciple? Talking about Legal 
Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 887, 899 (2002) (citing Michael Frost, Introduction to Classical Legal 
Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 613, 633 (1999». 
id. 
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writing as a rote skill, disconnected from the thinking process and, 
therefore, inferior in the hierarchy within the academy. 
In the mid-twentieth century, rhetoric and composition studies 
underwent significant change. Contemporary scholars of rhetoric and 
writing argued that language is constitutive of thought; they argued 
language creates thought and meaning is made through language. 132 Under 
this view, writing is not peripheral to thought but central and essentiaL 133 
Hans-Georg Gadamer further argued true objective meaning in a text could 
not be found by any reader but readers interpret a text in particular contexts. 
Meaning from a particular text is derived from the dialectic which occurs 
between reader and text. 134 
The changes in composition and rhetoric theory were minored in legal 
writing pedagogy. Scholars identify three theoretical approaches to 
teaching legal writing which have been influential in law school 
curriculums: the traditional or product approach, the process approach (or 
"New Rhetoric"), and the social context approach. l35 All three approaches 
are found in most law school writing programs. 136 Indeed, most legal 
132 See Linda Flower & John R. Hayes, A Cognitive Process Theory of Writing, 32 C. 
COMPOSITION & COMM. 365, 366-87 (1981); see also Berger, supra note 125, at 58; P01hnan, 
supra note 130, at 902-03. 
133 See Lynn Z. Bloom, The Great Paradigm Shift and Its Legacy for the Twenty-First 
Century, in COMPOSITION STUDIES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: REREADING THE PAST, 
REWRITING THE FUTCRE 33 (Lynn Z. Bloom et ai. eds., 2003); Maxine Hairston, The Winds of 
Change: Thomas Kuhn and the Revolution in the Teaching of Writing, 33 C. COMPOSITION & 
COMM. 76, 78 (1982). 
134 See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 292 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald 
Marshall trans., Crossroad 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960); see also Pollman, supra note 130, at 901 
(citing Teresa Godwin Phelps & Jenny Ann Pitts, Questioning the Text: The Significance of 
Phenomenological Hermeneutics for Legal Interpretation, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 353, 354, 358-59 
(1985». 
135 See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 100, at 50 (discussing "a revised view of legal 
writing" through three perspectives: the formalist perspective, the process perspective, and the 
social perspective); see also Parker, supra note 100, at 565. 
136 See Ellie Margolis & Susan L. DeJamatt, Moving Beyond Product to Process: Building a 
Better LRW Program, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 93,99 (2005) ("In the past two decades or so, 
LRW [Legal Research and Writing] has undergone a pedagogical revolution that has shifted our 
emphasis from thc product of writing to the process of writing." (citing Durako et aI., supra note 
96, at 719-20); see also Phelps, supra note 127, at 1090; Rideout & Ramfield, supra note 100, 
at 63. 
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writing programs do not fit one model, but embrace all three in a 
postmodern mix.137 
The product or instrumental method is finnly imbedded in traditional 
modernist pedagogy and is the model first used by legal writing teachers. 138 
Under the instrumental approach, the teacher and the writer, using fonnal 
and rigid rules, focused on the final product of the writing as opposed to the 
process of writing. Writing, under this approach, is thought to begin once 
the thought process is complete, rather than seen as a thinking or discursive 
process. Writing courses that focus on a product approach have been 
criticized as neglecting important considerations in the instruction of its 
students and thus being too narrow in scope and deficient in instruction. 139 
For example, the product-centered model is epitomized by a writing 
instructor who lectures about proper writing fonn, assigns a five-paragraph 
essay, and then grades the assignment without opportunities for feedback or 
revision. 140 
The product-centered model was supplanted by the process method. 141 
The process method, also called "new rhetoric,,,142 is firmly embraced by 
legal writing programs in most law schools. 143 The process method 
emphasizes the acts involved in the writing rather than the final written 
137 See Margolis & DeJamatt, supra note 136, at 99. 
138 See Pollman, supra note 130, at 893; see also Phelps, supra note 127, at 1093-94; 
Rideout, supra note 100, at 49. 
Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 100, at 50; see also Phelps, supra note 127, at 1094; 
Nancy Soonpaa, Using Composition Theory and Scholarship to Teach Legal Writing More 
Effectively, 3 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEG. WRITING INST. 81, 82-83 (1997). 
140 See Pollman, supra note 130, at 896-98. 
141 See Hairston, supra note 133, at 77-78; see also Fajans & Falk, supra note 127, at 173-
74, 174 nn.44, 46 (citing James A. Berlin, Contemporary Composition: The Major Pedagogical 
Theories, in THE WRITING TEACHER'S SOURCEBOOK 47, 53, 55-58 (Gary Tate & Edward P.J. 
Corbett eds., 2d ed. 1988)). This metanarrative of the development of the predominance of the 
process method and the process-product dichotomy is criticized as overly reductive and simplistic 
by scholars tracing Composition theory. See Paul Kei Matsuda, Process and Post-Process: A 
Discursive History, 121. SECOND LANGUAGE WRITING 65, 67-69 (2003). 
142 See Phelps, supra note 127, at 1094-98 (labeling the "process method" part of "new 
rhetoric theory"); cj. Berger, supra note 125, at 61 ("New Rhetoric Theory thus extends beyond 
the 'process approach' .... "). 
Margolis & DeJamatt, supra note 136, at 99; Fajans & Falk, supra note 127, at 174; 
see also Durako, supra note 96, at 719-20; Susan L. DeJamatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, and 
Entering the Discourse of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489,496 (2002) ("Writing is no longer viewed as 
the mere transcription of thought, but rather as an active way of making meaning .... "). 
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product. Coupled with the focus on the writing process came an emphasis 
on seeing students as the central focus of the classroom rather than the 
~~~~ . 
Professor Gary Olsen cogently sums up ten essential characteristics of 
the process method that are readily identifiable in a legal writing classroom 
today: 
[W]riting is an "activity," ... that is itself composed of a 
variety of activities; that the activities involved in the act of 
writing are typically recursive rather than linear; that 
writing is first and foremost a social activity; that the act of 
writing can be a means of learning and discovery; that 
experienced writers are often intensely aware of audience, 
purpose, and context; that experienced writers invest 
considerable amounts of time in invention and revision 
activities; that effective instruction. . provides 
opportunities for students to practice the kinds of activities 
involved in the act of writing; that such instruction includes 
ample opportunities [for peer review]; that effective 
composition instructors grade a student's work not solely 
on the finished product but also on the efforts the student 
has invested in the process of crafting the product; and that 
successful composition instruction entails finding 
appropriate occasions to intervene in each student's writing 
process. 145 
As can be seen from this list of characteristics, the process method is a 
flexible, muIti-faceted and dynamic operation.146 It cannot be characterized 
as "modernist." This move to a process and student-oriented method of 
teaching legal writing was grounded in the postmodern impulse that 
rejected single, unitary models or formula for the instruction.147 
144 See Gary A. Olson, Towards a Post-Process Composition: Abandoning the Rhetoric of 
Assertion, in POST-PROCESS THEORY: BEYOND THE WRITING-PROCESS PARADIGM 7, 7-15 
(Thomas Kent ed, 1999); see Soonpaa, supra note 139, at 82-83 (stating "researchers began to 
question the product-oriented composition course, began to teach their classes with a student-
centered focus, and began a new age in teaehing writing"). 
145 See Olson, supra note 144, at 7. 
146 See Bloom, supra note 133, at 33. 
147 See FELDMA~, supra note 7, at 36. 
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The process method, while stemming from postmodern theorists' re-
evaluation of traditional pedagogy, is arguably still modernist rather than 
postmodern in that it still reduces and formalizes instruction of writing into 
a single method. The process method strives for a single truth about the 
best way to teach writing. But this theory shares an underlying postmodern 
trait which is recognition of a multitude of influences on the writing and 
thinking process. The recognition of the fluidity and uncertainty entailed in 
the process of thinking and writing grants these theories a postmodern bent. 
While the process method comes from postmodemism, the 
institutionalization of the process approaeh makes it a modernist construct. 
For example, the process method is called a method, which indicates that 
the process approach has been reduced to a singular construction and has 
lost its postmodern bent. Within composition studies, scholars have 
critiqued the rigidity of a linear writing process model found in modernist 
"process method" pedagogy and have replaced it with the idea that writing 
is a recursive process. Under a more postmodern process method, the 
emphasis should be on helping students develop their own writing process 
model. 148 This postmodern critique of the process method is sometimes 
labeled "post-process,,149 and is also part of "New Rhetoric" theory.15o 
Post-process advocates see some of the most recent composition 
theorists as having turned away from postmodern theory and reviving 
modernist paradigms or tropes for the instruction of writing. ISI Post-
148 See James A. Reither, Writing and Knawing: Toward Redefining the Writing Process. in 
LANDMARK ESSAYS ON WRITING PROCESS 141, 142 (Sondra Perl ed., 1994); see also Sondra 
Perl, The Composing Process of Unskilled College Writers, in LANDMARK ESSAYS 39, 58-59 
(Sondra Perl ed., 1994); Sondra Perl, Understanding CompOSing, in THE WRITING TEACHER'S 
SOURCEBOOK 113,117, supra note 141, at 113, 117-18. 
149 See Thomas Kent, Introduction, in POST-PROCESS THEORY; BEYOND THE WRITING-
PROCESS PARADIGM, supra note 144, at 5 ("[P]ost-process theorists hold that the writing act is 
public, thorougbly hermeneutic, and always situated and therefore cannot be reduced to a 
generalizable process. 
150 See Phelps, supra note 127, at 1094 (stating that the new rhetoric theory is more than a 
generalized process, rather it is public, the "audience ... figure[s] prominently in the assignment 
of writing task;" hermeneutic, "writing is fruitfully informed by linguistic research;" and situated, 
the writing is "rhetorically based."); see also Berger, supra note 125, at 62-64; Pollman, supra 
note 130, at 902-10 (defining New Rhetoric Theory as an extension of process theory and not a 
rejection of it). 
151 See, e.g., Sidney Dobrin, Paralogic Hermeneutic Theories, Power, and the Possibility for 
Liberating Pedagogies, in POST-PROCESS THEORY BEYOND THE WRITING-PROCESS PARADIGM, 
922 BAYLOR LA W REVIEW [Vol. 58:3 
process theory criticizes the process method for its overemphasis on the 
process of writing.152 Post-process theory also reclaims the traditional 
instrumental method of teaching legal writing by acknowledging the value 
of the product. 153 
Post-process theorists challenge the process method's over1y rigid 
defmition of the composing process, which posits writing occurs in three 
linear stages: pre-writing, writing, and revision. Post-process theorists, 
however, by observing and listening to writers at work, discovered big 
differences in how various writers created texts. Many writers, particularly 
experienced writers, combine elements of all three stages in complex ways 
to compose a finished written document.154 Thus, for most writers, writing 
is not linear, except perhaps in the advancement of the parts of the thinking 
process. Post-process theorists recognized that the composing process is 
complex, multi-layered and recursive, with many of the writing processes 
occurring at once, and information flowing back and forth and in several 
directions at once. 15S This non-linear, multi-leveled model of writing is 
quintessentially postmodern-it is antithetical to the unitary and linear 
approaches favored by modernism. 
Post-process critics, like postmodernist critiques of any modernist 
technique, call the process method, at least in its "pure form," too reductive 
and monolithic as a single theory.IS6 Post-process "does not constitute, in 
practice or theory, a rejection of the process movement, but rather its 
extension into the social world of discourse.,,157 Post-process theorists 
expand the process method to see the act of writing as a public act between 
the writer and "other language users" to whom writing must be 
accessible.15s They also see writing as an interpretative act where writing is 
context-specific, requiring the writer to be sensitive to the reader's situation 
supra note 144, at 139 ("[N]ewer process pedagogies are not really that different from older 
current-traditional formalisms .... "). 
[52 See id. at 138-39. 
153 See id. 
154 See generally Lester Faigley, Competing Theories of Process: A Critique and Proposal, in 
LANOlYIARK ESSAYS ON WRITING PROCESS, supra note 148, at 149. 
155 See Helen Rothschild Ewald, A Tangled Web of Discourses: On Post-Process Pedagogy 
and Communicative Interaction, in POST-PROCESS THEORY: BEYOND THE WRITING-PROCESS 
PARADIGM,supranote 144, at 116-20,128-30. 
156 See Bloom, supra note 133, at 36. 
157/d. 
158 See id. (citing Kent, supra note 149, at 16). 
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and motivations. 159 And finally, they see the writer as always situated 
somewhere and not ever truly writing from a neutral stance.160 From this 
perspective, the legal writing professional, using post-process theory, 
teaches students the conventions of the particular discourse and the needs of 
the audience or variety of audiences,I61 
Most legal writing teachers embrace the post-process theory. Students 
are almost always clearly told of the context, audience and purpose of their 
writing.162 The typical legal writing assignment informs the student where 
they are writing from (in the case of a memorandum assignment often as a 
clerk in a law office) and who they are writing to (an attorney in the law 
office) and the purpose of the written product.163 Some legal writing 
professionals have recognized the need for students to develop "multiple 
consciousness" or voices in their writing in the legal profession.164 Such an 
emphasis on the state of flux in the act of writing comes directly from the 
postmodern distrust of modernism's singular processes. 
Joel Cornwell, in a recent article, articulates the problems with the 
modernist approach used in legal writing classrooms.165 In the article, he 
encourages the integration of postmodern techniques into legal writing 
pedagogy. 166 Much of what Professor Cornwell says is apt, but legal 
writing pedagogy, either consciously or unconsciously, has for the most 
159 See id. 
160 See Kent, supra note 149, at 3. 
161 See Bloom, supra note 133 (discussing multiple consciousness). 
162 See Jan M. Levine, Designing Assignments for Teaching Legal Analysis. Research and 
Writing, 3 PERSP.: TEACHING LEG. RESEARCH & WRITING 58, 58 (1995); see generally HELENE 
S. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW (rev. 4th ed. 2003) (containing sanlp1e 
writing assigmnents and exercises throughout each chapter in the book). 
163 See SHAPO, supra note 162, at 142,357 (illustrating that memoranda are used to advise an 
attorney in a law office setting, and that an appellate or trial brief is used to educate or persuade a 
judge). 
164 See Chris K. Iijima, Separating Support From Betrayal: Examining the Intersections of 
Racialized Legal Pedagogy. Academic Support, and Subordination, 33 IND. L. REv. 737, 778-80 
(2000) (discussing Marl 1. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as 
Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 297, 298-99 (1992»; see also Eichhorn, 
supra note 2, at 125-26; Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy 
Contributes to the La'w's Marginalization QfOutsider VOices, 103 DICK. L. REv. 7, 53 (1998). 
165 See generally Cornwell, supra note 11. 
166 Id. at 1134-35. 
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part done as Professor Cornwell urges; legal writing professors now do mix 
modern and postmodern techniques into their classroomsY7 
An example of the use of postmodernism in today's legal writing 
classroom is the use of the social context or social constructivist approach 
in teaching writing. 168 This theory, which can be categorized as a post-
process writing theory, is directly and openly postmodern.169 Social 
constructivism posits ''that entities we normally call reality, knowledge, 
thought, facts, texts, selves, and so on are constructs generated by 
communities of like-minded peers.,,170 Professors in legal writing classes 
emphasize the contextual nature of legal writing. Students are asked to 
write in a particular setting to a particular audience, usually a partner in a 
law firm or a jUdge. This particular audience has very specific needs, form 
requirements and jargon. Legal writing professors emphasize the rhetorical 
devices will change as the social context changes. Thus, the tone, wording, 
style and format changes in a written document sent to a client, as compared 
to a judge or another attorney. The use of computers, e-mail and online 
filing has complicated even further the forms and style of written discourse, 
making instruction in legal writing not adaptable to modernist notions of 
regularity and uniformity but more emblematic of post modernism's fluidity. 
Furthermore, a number of legal writing scholars have noted legal 
writing teachers, as they become reflective about their responses to 
students' writing, complicate the writing composition and reading process 
for both students and teachers. The teacher is "unavoidably engaged in a 
rhetorical transaction" with the students. l7l This complex transaction takes 
into account the multiple audiences involved in the construction of a written 
document by a student and how the teacher's reading and reflection plays in 
this process.172 The recognition of this complexity is consistent with post-
process theory's skepticism of the process method. 
The legal writing classroom, due to these postmodern characteristics, 
avoids the modernist trap posed by a rigid application of anyone formal 
167 See Fajans & Falk, supra note 127, at 185 (observing that the University of Pittsburgh and 
Carnegie Mellon are colleges that have pioneered mixing modem and postmodem techniques in 
the classroom). 
168 See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 100, at 56-57. 
169 See id.; see also Berger, supra note 125, at 63. 
170 See Kenneth A. Brufee, Social Construction, Language, and the Authority of Knowledge: 
A Bibliographical Essay, 48 C. ENG. 773, 774 (1986). 
171 See Berger, supra note 127, at 159. 
172 See id. at 62. 
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composition theory, including the process method. Legal writing pedagogy 
does not--or should not-fully embrace pure process methodology. Most 
legal writing classes do not focus on the process of writing to the exclusion 
of the product. Scholars indicate many legal writing professors teach using 
the process method in tandem with a social context approach.173 But the 
traditional product approach is also important. In legal classes and in law 
practice, product is ultimately more impOliant than process. A student's 
grade is usually based on the product. Legal documents are tightly scripted, 
fOTInal, regimented and are the backbone of a lawyer's practice. The 
product is necessarily the focus of much of the instruction and attention of 
teacher and writer. In legal writing, like in postmodernism, the old (product 
emphasis) is intertwined with the new (the process method) and also mixed 
with the avant-garde (post-process). 
Legal writing professors have incorporated writing theories into the 
needs of the legal writing classroom and the profession to create a 
postmodern mix. As postmodern architecture is a mix of the old, new, 
natural and synthetic/74 postmodern legal writing classes are a mix of 
process, product and social context theories. Like postmodernism itself, 
legal writing pedagogy cannot be easily and neatly defined. The legal 
writing classroom uses traditional teaching methods like Socratic dialogue 
alongside computers and role playing.175 Legal writing teaching also adapts 
to fit the needs of each particular institution and the institutions' particular 
pedagogical needs. 176 This flexible, adaptive pedagogy is more akin to 
postmodernism's flexibility and fragmentation than modernism's unitary 
approaches. 
173 See Stanchi, supra note 164, at 11. 
174 See generally RAMSFIELD, supra note 41 (comparing legal writing to architecture). 
175 See Mary Kate Kearney & Mary Beth Beazley, Teaching Students How to "Think Like 
Lawyers ": Integrating Socratic Method with the Writing Process, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 885, 886 
(1991); see also Margolis & DeJarnatt, supra note 136, at 95-99 (2005); Romantz, supra note 
10, at 136-42. 
176 See Robin A. Boyle & Rita Durm, Teaching Law Students Through Individual Learning 
Styles, 62 ALB. L. REv. 213, 247 (1998) (discussing the need for schools to structure their legal 
writing class based on the individual school's goals and culture); see also Durako, supra note 96, 
at 744-47 (sharing conclusions from Villanova's innovative approach to the legal research and 
writing program); Pollman & Stinson, supra note 107, at 240 ("Language, like law, is a living 
tpjng. It grows and changes. It both reflects and shapes the communities that use it. The language 
of the community of legal writing professors demonstrates this process. "). 
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If one had to characterize the theory and pedagogy of the legal writing 
classroom as either modernist or postmodernist, the latter is the better 
descriptor. It is postmodernism's flexibility and accommodation of change 
that makes it the appropriate pedagogy for the legal writing classroom. 
VI. DECONSTRUCTION AND THE TEACHING OF LEGAL WRITING 
Outside of the legal academy, postmodernism instituted changes in the 
way writing and text are read and taught. The most profound of these 
postmodern theories is deconstruction. l77 Deconstruction profoundly 
affected both the legal writing and doctrinal law classrooms as well. I78 
Deconstruction is a tool of interpretation of texts put forward by Jacque 
Derrida, Paul de Man, Stanley Fish and others. 179 This tool emerges from 
an examination of the nature of language and, consistent with postmodern 
theory, sees indeterminacy of meaning in language. ISO Deconstruction 
177 See Gary Aylesworth, Post/nodernism, in STANrORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(2005), available at hti:p:llplato.stanford.edu/entrieslpostmodernism; see also Donaldson, supra 
note 2, at 336 ("A second way to understand postmodernism is as a methodology, a way of 
reading texts and interpreting history using a cluster of tools, the chief of which is 
deconstruction."); Postmodernism, in ISCm ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE &'ID PHILOSOPHY (B. 
Long ed., 2001~2005), available at hti:p;//www.iscid.org/encyclopediaIPostmodernism. But, like 
many things relating to postmodernism, there is some debate as to whether deconstruction is to be 
considered "postmodern." See Jacques Derrida, Marx & Sons, in GHOSTLY DEMARCATIONS: A 
SYMPOSIUM ON JACQUES DEAAJDA'S SPECTERS OF MARX 23, 228~29 (Michael Sprinkler cd., 
G.M. Goshgarian trans., 1999). Derrida, credited with Deconstruction, wrote: "postmodernism or 
poststrueturalism ... are catchall notions into which the most poorly informed public (and most 
often, mass-circulation press) stuffs nearly everything it does not like or understand, starting with 
'deconstruction.' I do not consider myself either a poststructuralist or a postmodernist," Id. 
178 A Westlaw search of the word "deconstruction" brings up some 3593 articles. 
179 See Jack M. Balkin, Deconstruction's Career,27 CARDOZO L. REv. 719, 719 
(2005). 
180 See lM. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.l 743, 783-86 
(1987); see also I.M. Balkin, Law and Social Theory, the Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 275, 318 
(1989); J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1613, 1613 (1990); I.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendental Justice, 
92 MICH. L. REV. 1131,1132-33 (1994); J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The 
Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 108 (1993). Steven 
Feldman also sees deconstruction as a tool in the "lawyer's toolbox." See Stephen M. Feldman, 
Playing with the Pieces: Postmodernism in the Laltyer's Toolbox, 85 VA. L. REV. 151, 151~52 
(1999); see also Feldman, supra note 32, at 1084. But see WEST, supra note 4, at 204 ("[A]s a 
tool of analysis deconstruction has all the usefulness of an unhinged steering wheel in avoiding a 
collision with a wall."). 
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seeks out meanings in text that are otherwise explicitly excluded in order to 
make authorized meaning possible.18l Deconstruction, by questioning the 
authorized meaning, exposes bias and unstated meanings in texts. 182 By 
identifying and reversing the conceptual hierarchies in a text, a new 
understanding can be derived from it. This dangerous supplement, 
however, has turned out, as defined in this Article,183 to be quite benign and 
quite established in the legal writing classroom and other parts of the 
academy. While deconstruction is dismissed or even ridiculed by some 
scholars/84 in the new millennium, it is a standard part of readers' and 
writers' thought processes. 185 Deconstruction exposes the multiplicity of 
meanings, both complicated and contradictory, present in a text. 186 
Any exercise in identifying and resolving ambiguity in legal writing will 
inevitably draw on deconstructive techniques. An examination of 
contemporary federal legislation, for example, would need some 
deconstructive tools to help students understand the interplay between what 
the statute says and what the statute is trying to accomplish or why the 
statute was written in its particular form. For example, a professor would 
have to call on de constructive tools to explain why a statute entitled, "The 
Defense of Marriage Act," precludes certain forms of marriage. 187 Legal 
meaning of the statute is created by the external social and cultural 
environment. Additionally, under traditional conceptual hierarchy, the title 
of a statute is a summary of the statute or an aspirational statement of what 
181 See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, supra note 180, at 783-86. 
182 See id. at 755-58. 
183 See JAQUES DERRIDA, DE LA GRAMMATOLOGIE ENGLISH 3 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
trans., 1976). 
184 See e.g., Arthur Austin, A Primer on Deconstruction's "Rhapsody of Word-plays ", 71 
N.C. L. REv. 201, 203 (1992) (asserting "applied to law, deconstruction is mischievous 
nonsense"); see also WEST, supra note 4, at 204. 
185 See Balkin, supra note 179, at 722 (analyzing legal, literary and philosophical 
deconstruction illustrating the pervasiveness of deconstruction among readers, writers, and 
scholars); see also Pierre Schlarg, A Brief Survey of Deconstruction, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 741, 
747-48 (2005) (deconstructing the deconstruction of another author's work). 
186 See Balkin, Deconstruction's Legal Career, supra note 179, at 727 (stating 
"[d]econstructive readings do not assert that texts have no meaning or that their meanings are 
undecipherable. Rather, deconstruction argues that texts are always overflowing with complicated 
and often contradictory meanings. The predicament that deconstruction finds in texts is not the 
lack of meaning but a surplus of it. "). 
187 See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as 
amended at 1 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000». 
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the statute hopes to achieve. I88 A deconstructive reading would question 
this traditional hierarchy and read the title of a statute to be related to 
mischaracterizing the law encompassed in the act or the title is the opposite 
of the aspirations of the act. 189 Any analysis of modern federal legislation, 
such as the "Clean Air Act" would be remiss if the reader did not perform 
this deconstructive reading of the title and other components of the statute. 
The real meaning of a title can only be understood by understanding the 
communities who are writing and reading the text. l90 
Joel Cornwell argues that deconstruction and other postmodern and 
poststructuralist tools have been slow to enter the legal writing 
classroom. i91 Certainly, deconstruction has had a greater effect in legal 
scholarship than in the law school classroom. in But Cornwell overstates 
his case. The teaching of legal writing, like much of the rest of the legal 
academy, has been affected by deconstruction. 193 Many in the legal writing 
community do in fact use deconstruction, either consciously or 
unconsciously, in their teaching.194 Deconstruction necessarily creeps into 
188 See Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348, 354 (1920) (stating "[t]he title of an aet 
cannot limit the plain meaning of its text, although it may be looked to aid in construction in cases 
of doubt"); see also BARBARA CHILD, DRAFTING LEGAL DOCUMENTS 197 (West 1992) (1988). 
189 For a wonderful example of a judge recognizing this postmodern irony of statutory 
drafting see In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005) (reference provided by Joseph R. 
Bazan). 
190The use of certain biblical buzzwords in political rhetoric is another example of text that 
assumes multiple interpretations depending on its audience. The words "left behind" can be read 
to mean "forgotten or neglected," but to certain evangelical Christian audiences, the words "left 
behind" invoke the notion of people who have not accepted Jesus Christ as their personal Savior 
and will be "left behind" at the time of the Rapture. Compare Left Behind Series, available at 
http://www.1eftbehind.com (last visited October 7, 2006), with No Child Left Behind Act of 200 I, 
Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified in various sections of20 U.S.C.). 
191 See Cornwell, supra note t 1, at 1092 ("Ironically, legal writing courses, the portion of the 
first-year curriculum ostensibly allotted to techniques of dissecting and manipulating language, 
have largely ignored the insights of analytical philosophy and literary deconstruction indirectly 
appropriated in other courses. "). 
192 See id. 
193 See WEST, supra note 4, 204 ("[A]s a tool of analysis deconstruction has all the usefulness 
of an unhinged steering wheel in avoiding a collision with a wall."); see also Peter Goodrich, 
Europe in America: Grammatology, Legal Studies, and the Politics o/Transmission, 101 COLUM. 
L. REv. 2033, 2079 (200 I); Pollman, supra note 130, at 901 ("Legal writing departments Oike the 
rest of the legal academy) were affected by these movements."). 
194 The topics of L WI articles and conference topics reflect the influence of deconstruction. 
See Eichhorn, supra note 2, at 105 (explaining that deconstruction's flipping of traditional 
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the legal writing teacher's reading of the students' texts. Deconstruction is 
used to figure out what a student may have meant when she wrote a 
particular sentence or chose a particular word. Explaining the conventions 
of legal writing, such as the omission of reference to "I," must be done in 
the context of explaining tbe conventions of the particular discourse 
community that demands sucb conventions. The difference in tone, style 
and content between a client letter, an office memorandum and a trial brief 
implicate deconstruction's view of text as determined by context and 
requiring purposeful ambiguity or jargon as context requires. Finally, any 
discussion of the use of footnotes in a legal writing class most likely takes 
into account the use and power of footnotes in judicial decisions and other 
forms of legal writing. 195 Examining and critiquing the hierarchy of 
importance of the footnote in a text is a direct use of deconstruction to 
analyze and criticize texts. 196 
All of these uses of deconstruction can be found in the legal writing 
classroom in forms ranging from the benign to the radical depending on 
how they are used by the professor. 197 Most legal writing professors 
probably do not deliberately teach deconstruction in their classroom. Nor 
do they blindly teach modernist tropes like lRAC without contexts and tools 
hierarchy gave the technique the label of a "dangerous supplement"); see also Lorraine Bannai & 
Anne Enquist, (Un)Examined Assumptions and (Un)Intended Messages: Teaching Students to 
Recognize Bias in Legal Analysis and Language, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1,3-9 (2003); Debra 
Moss Curtis & Judith R. Karp, "In a Case, In a Book. They Will Not Take a Second Look!" 
Critical Reading in the Legal Writing Classroom, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 293, 303-04 (2005); 
Litowitz, supra note 7, at 39--46; Andrea McArdlc, Further Reflections on Voice in Legal Writing 
Pedagogy: Negotiating the Space Between Lawyerly Discourse and Creativity, Legal Writing 
Institute-Publications: L WI 2004 Conference Bibliography Directory (Seattle, W A), available at 
http://www.1wionline.org/publications/bibliographies2004.asp;Pollman.supranoteI30.at 893. 
While many in the legal writing profession use deconstruction in some form in their teaching 
repertoire, I fear that many do so without acknowledging or naming what they do. See id. 
195 See Abner J. Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 647, 649 (1985). 
196 See Kathryn M. Stanchi, Exploring the Law of Law Teaching: A reminist Process, 34 J. 
MARSHAll L. REv. 193, 205 (2000); see also Brook K. Baker, Language Acculturation 
Processes and Resistance to In "Doctrine "ation in the Legal Skills Curriculum and Beyond: A 
Commentary on Mertz's Critical Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal Classroom, 34 J. 
MARSHALLL. REv. 131, 149 (2000); Stanchi, supra note 164, at 8-9, 
Stanchi, supra note 196, at 205 ("To truly educate students, writing professors 
must also teach them that thinking like a lawyer can mean what a good, creative lawyer who is 
challenging the system might think and do. This way, students can enter law practice knowing that 
creativity and deconstruction are not solely scholarly activities, but are useful--even essential-to 
good lawyering."). 
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emanated from deconstruction. Postmodernism has permeated the teaching 
of legal writing in such a way that it has not disrupted but simply enriched 
it. Deconstruction has been incorporated into the writing classroom in a 
way that supplements rather than supplants the other modernist tools of 
teaching. 
VII. POSTMODERNISM, STORY-TELLING AND THE TEACHING OF LEGAL 
WRITING 
Another way postmodernism has affected the legal academy is by 
recognizing and promoting the role of stories and story-telling in the law.198 
The power of stories and story-telling in effective legal writing is something 
legal writing instructors have recognized and discussed for many years. 199 
Legal writing instructors' acknowledgment of the power of stories comes 
directly from postmodern theorists' identification and explication ofthe role 
and power of narrative in the construction of thought and manipulation of 
power,z°o Narrative and storytelling are used in two ways by postmodern 
theorists: first, they are used in a broad mallfler to identifY the underlying 
assumptions and viewpoints of a piece of writing. Postmodern theorists 
often will refer to this as the metanarrative behind a piece of writing or an 
idea.201 Metanarratives are stories that provide a scheme or explanation that 
people use to make sense of the world.202 Postmodern theorists argue all 
198 See Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAW'S STORIES; NARRATIVE AND 
RHETORIC IN THE LAW 2, 2 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). 
199 See Stephen V. Armstrong & Timothy P. Terrell, Organizing Facts to Tell Stories, 9 
PERSP: TEACHING LEGAL REs. & WRITING 90, 90 (2001); see also Marcia Canavan, Uving 
Literature to Teach Legal Writing, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 1, 12-13 (2004); Brian J. Foley & 
Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing 
Techniques to Write Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 459, 459-60 (2001) (indicating 
legal writing texts have been encouraging students to "tell a story" when writing the statement of 
facts); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old 
Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2099, 2104-06 (1989) (discussing empathy and storytelling); Kim 
Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2075 (1989). 
200 See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 100, at 51-52 (stating that writing is an extension or 
reflection of thOUght, thus it would necessarily follow that writing is also COIDlected in this way to 
narrative). But see AMOREY GETHIN, L~'1GUAGE AND THOUGHT: A RAnONAL ENQUIRY INfO 
THEIR NATURE AND RELATIONSHIP 37 (1999). 
201 See Anne Ruggles Gere, Narratives of Composition Studies, 3 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL 
WRlTING INST. 51, 51-52 (1997) (using the term "narratives" to describe how Composition 
Studies views itself). 
202 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
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argument is a fonn of narrative or storytelling.203 The legal writer's goal is 
to persuade that his or her story or narrative is true and should be valued 
over others' stories or narratives.204 Postmodernism's distrust of one central 
truth provides the foundation of this viewpoint.205 
The idea of metanarrative is a common device used in teaching legal 
writing which comes under different labels. For example, when writing an 
appellate brief, students are instructed to develop a theory of the case or a 
theme that will most effectively move the judge or reader to rule in favor of 
that client. This theory of the case is usually pitched as a story or 
metanarrative.206 This story then competes with the story or metanarratives 
presented by the opposing party. 
203 See Richard Delgado, Storytelling/or Oppositionists and Others: A Plea/or Narrative, 87 
MICH. L. REv. 2411,2415 (1989). 
The strongest arguments in favor of legal storytelling are best understood within the 
context of the current intellectual reaction against formalism and grand theory. A broad 
array of recent legal commentary has suggested a movement away from these dominant 
forms of legal analysis, which focus on abstract, deductive reasoning from high-level 
principles or general rules, toward something new, sometimes called practical reason or 
pragmatism. 
Daniel A. Farber & Susanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out a/School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 
45 STAN. L. REv. 807, 820 (1993). 
204Thomas Morawetz, Law's Essence: Lawyers As Tellers a/Tales, CONN. L. REv. 899, 905-
06 (1997). 
Id. 
The conceptual (second) version of critical theory seems to reinforce one of the basic 
ideas of postrnodemism, the rejection of the idea of a master narrative. This is the 
apparent recognition of the fact that events do not come packaged with an objectively 
correct or preferred interpretation. Events can be seen from different perspectives and 
incorporated into different narratives. Neutral or objective description is as much a 
chimera as neutral principles of law. Abstract theorizing about optimal forms of law 
must give way to storytelling about the various different ways any legal regime will be 
experienced. 
205 See Jan M. Van Dunne, Narrative Coherence and Its Function in Judicial Decision 
Making and Legislation, 44 AM. 1. COMPo L. 463, 486 (1996) (characterizing the conclusions of 
her argument as a story's "happy ending"); see also Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 
GEO. L.1. 2475,2531 (1993) ("Law is a compendium of stories about how we use and abuse rules 
to manage our social relations and resolve both our differences and commonality. Legal 
narratives constitute one strand (and a very 'thick' one) in the long-standing conversation about 
order and disorder in our social and legal existence."). 
206 See RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE, 
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The second and more common, but somewhat controversial, use of 
stories and narrative is as an analytic and argumentative device. Parts of 
this component of storytelling are not controversial but firmly established 
components of legal discourse. War stories are used in teaching and legal 
scholarship for dramatic and illustrative effect.207 Students are urged to 
present statements of facts in legal documents as stories. Those who write 
legal writing problems, exam questions and classroom exercises cannot 
help but recognize the story-making process involved in these forms of 
legal discourse as well. A little more controversial, however, is the 
acknowledgment of the story or narrative components of caselaw and 
judges' opinions.208 Viewing cases or opinions as stories has been 
erroneously perceived as somehow denigrating or mischwdcterizing the 
law-making quality of these products.209 To the contrary, recognizing the 
narrative and storytelling components of these documents adds to their 
strength and power as pieces of writing and law. 
STRATEGY, AND STYLE 291,387-88 (4th ed. 2001) (stating "the lawyer must articulate the client's 
story in light of applicable doctrine and public policy .... Based on facts, doctrine, and policy 
values, the lawyer will identifY a theory of the case .... [which] will influence [the lawyer's] 
narrative choices .... Writing teachers can foster awareness of the lawyer's role as interpreter ... 
. [and] first-year legal writing courses can encourage students to think about the ways in which 
lawyers construct meaning."); see also Parker, supra note 100, at 594-96. 
207 See, e.g., Michael L. Seigcl, The Effective Use of War Stories in Teaching Evidence, 50 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1191, 1191 n.1, 1192 (2006) (defming war stories as "the retelling of an event from 
the teacher's experience as a practicing lawyer to illustrate a point in the classroom."); Durako, 
supra note 96, at 722; see also Deborah Schmcdemann, Do Best Practices in Legal Education 
Include an Obligation to the Legal ProfeSSion to Integrate Theory, Sldlls, and Doctrine in the Law 
School Curriculum?, 1. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 127, 128 (2002) (using there more apt 
term "peace stories"). 
208 See W. LA:-.ICE BENNETT & MARTIlA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE 
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 64-65 (1981) (arguing a post 
modernist construct, that because of the inherent nature of story and its impact in the criminal 
justice system at trial, the law and lcgal judgments are not "based on objective pictures of what 
really happened"); Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW'S STORIES: 
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 14, 15~17 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz cds., 1996); 
see also NARR.4.TlVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE (David Ray Papke ed., 1991); Symposium, 
Pedagogy of Narrative, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1 ~2 (1990); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989); Caron, supra note 121, at 409~1O; Stcven Lubet, The Trial as a 
Persuasive Story, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 77, 77 (1990) ("Each party in a trial is given the 
opportunity to tell a story .... "). 
209 See DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL 
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 5 (1997); see also Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of 
Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251, 251~52 (1992). 
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The most controversial aspect of narrative and story-telling in the law is 
the use of personal or fictional narrative in legal writing.210 Postmodern 
scholars promote storytelling as a tool for bringing a voice to silenced or 
marginalized people, particularly racial and religious minorities and 
women.21l The stories of those traditionally left from legal writing hold "a 
distinctive power to challenge and unsettle the legal status quO.,,212 Stories 
allow the reader to better understand things beyond normal experience. 213 
But such use of stories is open to criticism due to a story's subjectivity and 
lack of empirical substance. It is ironic, however, that the use of personal 
stories and narrative can be found in recent United States Supreme Court 
decisions214 and federal and state legislation.215 Like any rhetorical device, 
story-telling and narrative can be used and abused, but undeniably it has 
effect on both writers and readers of texts and must be considered when 
constructing legal writings. 
The use of fictional narrative is an established part of the oral discourse 
in law school classrooms and in courtrooms. In a doctrinal class where the 
professor uses a Socratic method of discussing cases and rules of law, a 
common device used by the professor to probe the students' understanding 
of the rules of law and the holdings of the cases is to ask hypothetical 
210 See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories From School: An ESsay on Legal 
Narratives,45 ST&>'<. L. REV. 807, 831-32 (1993). 
211 See Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeur, in Two Narrative Problems at the Criminal Trial, 
in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW, supra, note 208 at 135, 136. 
212See Id. 
213 See Delgado, supra note 203, at 2440 (summarizing the impact of story-telling in the 
following way: "[s]tories humanize us. They emphasize our differences in ways that can 
ultimately bring us closer together. They allow us to see how the world looks from behind 
someone else's spectacles."). The role of story-telling and the power of narrative can be 
illustrated by the differences between Old and New Testament law. Jesus' parables or stories in 
the New Testament have a very different power compared to some of the directive laws in the Old 
Testament such as the Ten Commandments. See, e.g., Luke 11: 16, Exodus 20:2. 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349-51 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (quoting Frederick Douglas speaking to a group of abolitionists "almost 140 
years ago"); see also Ronald Turner, Grutter and the Passion of Justice Thomas: A Response to 
Professor Kearney, 13 WM. & MARy BILL RTS. 1. 821, 824-830 (2005) (considering Thomas' 
opinion in Grntter). 
42 U.s.c. § 14071 (2004); see also Judicial Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie 
Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-03, 119 Stat. 15 (2005); Kathy L. Cerminara, Musings on the Need to 
Convince Some People with Disabilities That End-aI-life Decision-making Advocates Are Not out 
to Get Them, 37 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 343, 347 (2006); David Hyman, Do Good Stories Make For 
Good Policy?, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y & L. 1149, 1149 (2000). 
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questions based on alterations of the facts of cases the students have read.216 
The hypothetical questions are, in essence, mini-stories. More obviously, 
exam questions are usually written in a narrative or story form. Some 
professors directly adopt scenarios from popular culture for their questions. 
Similarly, the dialogue between an advocating counsel, or moot court 
student, and a judge during oral argument typically has the judge imagining 
and articulating fictional scenarios or stories that explore the boundaries of 
the legal rule being argued by the advocate.217 
These uses of stories and narrative are not new and not attributable to 
postmodernism. Postmodern theory, however, has allowed those working 
in the legal writing profession to identify and name these rhetorical devices 
and acknowledge the powers and dangers of the storytelling and narrative 
process.218 Thus, the power given by postmodernism to name or create 
jargon about this rhetorical device is not really dangerous in itself but 
illuminating and crucial to the advancement of the understanding of the 
power of legal writing. Teaching about story writing and narrative does not 
supplant careful deductive and analogical reasoning in legal writing, but is a 
powerful supplement. 
VIII.POSTMODERN ACROBATICS IN THE LEGAL WRITING CLASSROOM 
In addition to postmodem theories affecting the legal writing classroom, 
postmodemism's approach to disruptive analysis is a component of the 
legal writing instruction.219 Legal writing classrooms often use the 
216 See Kennedy, supra note 122, at 17~29. 
217 See E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., The Supreme Court's Use of Hypothetical Questions at Oral 
Argument, 33 CATH. U. L. REv. 555,556 (1984). 
!d. 
218 Michael Grossberg, How To Tell Law Stories, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 459, 460 (199~). 
Among the many debates by the return to storytelling has been one about 
authorial intent and authorial voice. This specific debate has been strongly influenced 
by postmodemism generally and by recent understandings of textual creation and 
interpretation developed by literary critics more particularly. While I do not want to 
rehearse all the various arguments here, I do want to emphasize that one of the major 
results of this debate has been a much greater consciousness about the authorial role in 
all narratives. 
219 See David West, The Contribution of Continental Philosophy, in A COMPANION TO 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 39, 65 (Robert E. Goodin & Phillip Pettit eds., 1993) 
("Postmodemists seek to disrupt all fonus of discourse, and particularly fomts of political 
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postmodern device ofthe conceptual flip, which disrupts or upends standard 
modernist tropes.220 Professor Feldman uses the term flip to describe a 
postrnodernist ability or dexterity to reposition or view a text through 
different prisms and, thereby, uncover multiple and varied understandings 
of it: 
A postmodern flip is a gestalt switch or paradigm move that 
reverses our prior approach to a text (or an event or a 
concept) and, in so doing, reveals previously unrecognized 
features of that text. Whereas modernists constantly 
attempt to reduce the meanings of texts to an essential core 
or single truth, postrnodernists are anti-foundationalists and 
anti-essentialists. According to postmodernists, the 
meaning of a text is never grounded or stable, and therefore 
one can always find multiple meanings or truths. Thus, one 
performs a postmodern flip by taking a segment of a text, 
event, or concept that apparently has been reduced to a 
static meaning or truth and suggesting the possible 
existence of another (often radically different) meaning or 
truth. This alternative meaning or truth often emerges after 
one uncovers and disturbs the usually tacit assumptions 
underlying the original meaning. The postmodern flip then 
is completed by exploring how this new meaning or truth of 
the segment of the text, event, or concept might reorient 
one's understanding ofthe whole. 221 
Legal writing professionals regularly engage in this postrnodern flip as a 
teaching tool. They begin the process of teaching legal writing by formal 
instruction in thoroughly modernist doctrine.· But once this formal doctrine 
is learned by the student, the professor performs a postrnodern flip on the 
student by disrupting the formulaic or formalistic doctrine instructed to the 
student. Below are some examples of the flip between modernism and 
postmodernism often performed by legal writing instructors. 
discourse, which might encourage the totalitarian suppression of diversity."); see also Brenda 
Cossman et aL, Gender, Sexuality, and Power: Is Feminist Theory Enough, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER 
& L. 601, 624 (2003). 
220 See FELDMAN, supra note 7. 
221 See Feldman, supra note 32, at 1048; see also Barbara K. Bucholtz, Gestalt Flips by an 
Acrobatic Supreme Court and the Business-Related Cases on Its 2000-2001 Docket, 37 TuLSA L. 
REv. 305, 307 (2001). 
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A. The Case Briefing Flip 
Legal writing courses often begin by teaching students about case 
briefing.222 Case briefing is a method of summarizing cases to understand 
and digest their particular parts. Students are usually taught a certain form 
for these briefs. Typically a case brief is made up of sections reciting the 
title, court, the year of decision, the facts, the procedural posture, the issues 
raised, the holdings, the rationale of the court and additional considerations 
such as any dissenting opinions or issues of policy raised by the case. The 
process of constructing case briefs is a quintessential modernist act. The 
case brief reduces a complex text and creates a singular meaning for the 
student. A student is likely to be graded on whether he or she has correctly 
stated the issue presented or the holding of the case. 
Once students have mastered the form of the case brief (or perhaps 
during the instruction), the task is complicated and problematized by the 
instructor who will flip the task from a straight-forward modernist exercise 
into a postmodern task. Students are told or discover there are usually 
multiple issues in a case and they should keep in mind the purpose of the 
case when briefing. In other words, if the case is being read for a torts 
class, the torts issues should be the focus of the case brief rather than 
evidentiary or procedural issues may also be present in the case. Students 
are told the holding can be expressed in a variety of ways depending on 
how the holding is to be used. The holding can be articulated broadly or 
narrowly, actively or passively. Finally, students are often told case 
briefing is simply a tool for organizing one's thoughts and notes about cases 
and hence, there is in fact no one correct way to write a case brief. 223 Thus, 
once a student has been fully instructed in case briefing, the straightforward 
formulaic case brief has been transformed into a more fluid, indeterminate 
document that raises as many questions about the text of a case as it 
answers.224 
222 See SHAPO, supra note 162, at 33·-37; see also DEBORAH A. SCHMEDEMANN & 
CHRISTINA L. KL'NZ, SYNTHESIS: LEGAL READING, REASONING, Ai'iD WRITING, 41, 49 (2d ed. 
2003); Gail Anne Kintzer et aI., Rule Based Legal Writing Problems: A Pedagogical Approach, 3 
LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 143, 145-49 (1997). 
223 See ANN M. BURKHART & ROBERT A. STEIN, How TO STUDY LAW AND TAKE LAW 
EXAMS IN A NUTSHELL 104-06 (1996); Paula Lustbader, Construction Sites, Building Types, and 
Bridging Gaps: A Cognitive Theory of the Learning Progression of Law Students, 33 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 315, 325 (1997). 
224 See Leews, A Few Basic Truths About Law School, available at 
http://www.1eews.comllaw_schoo1_basic_truths.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2006) (encouraging 
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B. The Case Synthesis Flip 
Similarly, the case synthesis is often taught using the modernist and 
postmodernist flip method, as well. Case synthesis is typically taught by 
giving students a series of cases and asking the students to derive a single 
rnle of law from what appears or may in fact be conflicting holdings from 
the cases.225 This exercise might be done by having the student first derive 
a rule of law from each single case separately, and then, the student must 
determine a rule of law comparatively, thereby requiring the students to 
flip, or at least alter, the original unitary rules drafted for each separate case. 
Such an exercise is grounded in the modernist normative act of bringing . 
unitary order from seemingly disordered law. But this seemingly modernist 
act of synthesis can also be flipped to lead to create within the student a 
sense of the indeterminacy of the law. A rule can be subject to change by 
the introduction of new facts and changing societal norms.226 Students 
recognize the rule synthesized is merely a proposed rule and one subject to 
critique by an opposing counselor unsympathetic judge or changed 
circumstances. The case synthesis exercise, which strives to create clear 
rules of law also-paradoxic ally-undermines the very sense of certainty a 
student might have about what constitutes the law under the American 
common law system. 
students to only brief a case in one or two lines or to "book brief'); Richard J. Conviser, First 
Year Survival Manual, available at 
http://stu.findlaw.com/outlines/commercialoutJgilbert/survival.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2006); 
cf Christina Kunz, 2003 MLS QuestiOns and Answer Session, 34 U. ToL. L. REV. 728, 732 
(2003) (discussing "micro book briefmg"); Paul Bateman, Ten Instructions for Briefing Cases, 
available at http://wwwJaw.umkc.eduifacuItyiprofiles/giesnerfines/bateman.htm (last visited 
Sept 6, 2006). 
225 See, SCHMEDEMANN, supra note 222, at 42; SHAPO, supra note 162, at 57-63; Jerry L. 
Anderson, Law School Enters the Matrix: Teaching Critical Legal Studies, 54 1. LEGAL EDUC. 
201,209 (2004). 
226 LINDA EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION 125 (3d 
ed.2002); see also Linda Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic Imaginations in 
Legal Discourse, 20 LEGAL STUDIES FORUM 8, 32-40 (1996). 
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C. The IRAC Flip 
The use of the deductive syllogism commonly known by the acronym 
IRAC227 as a legal writing tool has been the subject of much criticism for its 
modernist characteristics.228 The IRAC formula has much in common with 
the five-paragraph essay much derided by the advocates of the process 
method of teaching writing. The syllogism is a typical modernist construct 
which reduces the analytical process into a scientific formula compelled by 
formal logic. Once a legal issue has been identified, the major premise of 
the syllogism corresponds to the rule relevant to the identified issue. The 
minor premise corresponds to the application of the rule to the facts of the 
given case. The conclusion is then derived from the premises. The simple 
logic and simplicity of this formula makes IRAC a tool embraced by 
writing professors and students alike. But the drawbacks, stemming from 
the formula's tendency to be overly reductive, require most legal writing 
professors to flip this formula and force the legal writer to question the 
construction of the premises that make up the IRAC formula. 
Students, at the beginning of the legal writing course, are usually given 
assignments containing a limited set of material and facts. These 
assignments create closed universes where the legal rule is relatively 
straight forward and can be used to argue in favor or against a particular 
outcome. In this type of limited assignment in an academic setting, the 
IRAC syllogism works quite well. As students delve into more complex 
writing-where the law, facts and underlying policy considerations of a 
case are uncertain-the lRAC structure begins to break down.229 In a given 
case, as often found in appellate brief problems, the issue may be a debate 
about the interpretation ofa given rule oflaw while the facts of the case are 
not at issue. In this situation, the IRAC syllogism is less compelling and if 
applied strictly, might insult the reader or impede effective writing. Thus, 
once students understand and master IRAC, they are then told to question, 
227 See Pollman, supra note 130, at 898 (explaining that lRAC is an acronym for a widely 
used organizational structure found in legal writing referring to issue, rule, application and 
conclusion in an attempt to articulate a step-by-step guide to analytical organization). 
228 See Cornwell, supra note 11, at 1113-16; see also Pollman & Stinson, supra note 107, at 
261-62; Mary Beth Beazley, Point/Counterpoint: Use of lRAC-Type Formulas-Desirable or 
Dangerous, THE SECOND DRAFT, Nov. 1995, at 1, 1-20, available at 
http://www.lwionline.org/publications/seconddraftlnov9 5.pdf (criticizing lRAC). 
229 See Cornwell, supra note 11, at 1114; see also Michele G. Falkow, Pride and Prejudice 
Lessons: Legal Writers Can Learnfrom Literature, 21 TOURO L. REV. 349,366 (2005). 
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alter or reject it as need be.230 The postmodern emphasis on audience, 
purpose, setting and conventions are, in most legal writing classrooms, 
more important than the formal application of the syllogism; modernist 
formalism is flipped in favor of a more postmodern, fluid approach to 
writing. 
The postmodern flip, as practiced in the legal writing classroom, is not 
particularly dangerous or radical; it is merely a tool for effectively teaching 
a subject that has fluid and indeterminate components. These postmodern 
tools supplement and not supplant the regular teaching tools. They are 
indispensable. Students are ill-served by any instruction in the writing 
process which oversimplifies or reduces the complexities of legal writing. 
Postmodernism's supplement to the classroom allows legal writing 
professionals to be as flexible and adaptive as the subject requires. 
IX. POSTMODERN PARADOXES OF THE LEGAL WRITING 
PROFESSIONAL 
The teaching of legal writing has postmodern attributes, not only 
because of the influence of postmodern theory on the discipline, but also 
because legal writing embodies characteristics of postmodernism. One of 
the prime postmodern characteristic found in the teaching of legal writing is 
its entanglement in paradox.231 
Paradox is a key component of postmodernism.232 Modernism eschews 
paradox and laments the uncertainty implicit in paradox.233 Postmodernism, 
consistent with its rejection of modernism, celebrates paradox.234 Paradox 
is seen as an inescapable component of a person's condition in the 
230 See generally EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION, 
supra note 226. See also SHAPO, supra note 162, at 113 (stating that some legal writing 
instruction on lRAC does not use the flip but instead merely prefaces instruction about lRAC with 
preliminary caveats about its limitations). 
231 See generally Susan P. Liemer, The Quest For Scholarship: The Legal Writing Professor's 
Paradox, 80 OR. L. REV. 1007 (2001). 
232 See FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 169; see also MINDA, supra note 7, at 5. 
233 See MORLEY, supra note 30. 
234 See MINDA, supra note 7, at 5; JEAN-FRANCOIS L YOTARD, THE POSTMODERN 
CONDITION: A REpORT ON KNOWLEDGE. 60 (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massum trans., 1984); 
see also KEN VINSON, THE CASE AGAINST THE LAW: LEGAL JARGON, LEGAL LEA&"IING, AND 
LEGAL LEGERDEMAIN 3 (2004). 
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postmodem or post-industrial era.235 (In a similar vein, irony is celebrated 
in postmodernism.236) 
One paradox found in the teaching of legal writing is that the legal 
writing class engages students at some of the highest theoretical levels a 
student is likely to find in a first-year law class while simultaneously 
providing the most practical of all first-year classes. It is in the legal 
writing class that students will analyze the structure of argument and 
language itself, how the law is constructed or destroyed through the 
manipulation of language.237 Some legal writing classrooms introduce 
students to jurisprudential theory such as formalism, realism, positivism, 
deconstruction, and critical legal studies issues in the context of how a piece 
of writing can be read by different audiences.238 Some instructors begin the 
semester by questioning what constitutes the law, viewing the process of 
learning to write about the law as part of the process of learning what is the 
law and the role of a lawyer.239 These highly theoretical components of 
teaching are contrasted by the undeniable practicality of the subject. The 
skills learned in legal writing classes help students find jobs by giving them 
skills useful for law office practice and writing samples. In addition, the 
skills learned in legal writing class directly help students succeed in their 
other classes. Learning to synthesize cases helps students prepare their 
outlines in their other classes. Learning to structure a legal argument helps 
them write a good exarn answer in their doctrinal classes. 
Legal writing classes are a paradoxical combination of high and low 
technology. Legal writing is based upon the most basic of subjects and 
tools: writing done on paper with ink (or done on chalkboard with chalk). 
Legal writing is also based upon the most complex of technology: laptop 
and classroom computers which are projected onto screens by LCD 
235 See MINDA, supra note 7, at 2. 
236 See Balkin, supra note 20, at 1968; see also FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 40-41. 
Z37 See LAUREL CURRIE OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, TIlE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK: 
ANALYSIS, RESEARCH, A.'1D WRITING 419 (4th ed. 2006); see also Julie M. Spanbauer, Teaching 
First-Semester Students that Objective Analysis Persuades, 5 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL 
WRITING INST. 167, 168 (1999). 
238 See Falk & Fajans, supra note 127, at 163--65; see also Stanchi, supra note 164, at 27. 
m See SCHMEDEMANN, supra note 222, at 30-37 (connecting case briefs to the process of 
learning the law). 
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projectors.z40 This most basic of skills is also taught in a postmodem mix of 
old and new. While students will certainly use paper and pens in and 
outside of the legal writing class, the typical class will be a combination of 
lecture, Socratic dialogue, video, PowerPoint, small groups, one-on-one 
work and role playing.241 Besides writing, students will read, reorganize, 
revise, edit, recite and manipulate legal text. These activities take place in 
and outside the classroom, in the library, coffee shops, and online. The 
diffused and fragmented components of this instruction clearly place it in 
the category of a postmodem phenomenon in marked contrast to traditional 
modem lecture-based or instructor-focused classes. 
A component of postmodemism is an emphasis on what is traditionally 
marginal: postmodernism transforms the marginal into the major focus of 
inquiry.242 There are certainly aspects of the legal writing class where this 
postmodem trait is apparent, particularly the emphasis in legal writing 
courses on the minutia of proper citation form, proper formatting (paper, 
font, margin sizes), and correct grammar, style and usage. The enormous 
importance of these non-substantive parts of writing in the writing class 
disrupts the standard modernist preference of substance over form. In 
contrast to the modernist paradigm of learning from some central text, 
much of the learning our students perform is from writing in the margins of 
text. Often our writing to our students is done through marginalia; we 
comment on their drafts, we respond to their emails, we cross, circle, 
underline and hyperlink ours and their texts. 
There are also essentialist paradoxes in the writing found in legal 
writing classes. Students are told to remove the word "I" from their legal 
writing (especially "I believe," "I feel," "I think,,)?43 But paradoxically 
students are told to come up with original arguments and think for 
themselves. If a student does come up with an original argument, she may 
be, paradoxically, urged to find support for the argument because the idea 
240 See Thomas T. Barker & Fred O. Kemp, Network Theory: A Postmodern Pedagogy for the 
Writing Classroom, in COMPUTERS AND COMMUNITY: TEACHING COMPOSITION IN THE TwENTY· 
FIR.<;T CENTURY 1,23-26 (Carolyn Handa ed., 1990); Smith, supra note 103, at 123-27. 
24J See Kearney & Beazley, supra note 175, at 885; see also Lucia Ann Silecchia, Of 
Painters. Sculptors, Quill Pens. and Microchips: Teaching Legal Writers in the Electronic Age, 75 
NEB. L. REV. 802,846 (1996). 
242 See Litowitz, supra note 70, at 729 n.50; see also Sheehan, supra note 1, at 121; Barbara 
Stark, After word(s): 'Violations of Human Dignity' and Postmodern International Law, 27 YALE 
J.INT'LL. 315, 318 (2002). 
243 See OATES & ENQUIST, supra note 237, at 678-80. 
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will be more persuasive if it is not original but grounded in past precedent 
or scholarship from eminent juristS.244 Students are bombarded with 
conflicting modernist and postmodernist conceptions of writing. Modernist 
philosophy is grounded in the idea of the individual, solitary thinker 
creating ideas from whole cloth. Postmodernism is skeptical of the notion 
of an original idea and views all ideas emanating from others and the 
community. Thus, students are urged to be original and recognize their 
originality is grounded and made stronger by determining the sources of 
their idea and others who have identified it as well. 
Legal writing professionals also face paradoxes which arise from their 
place and status in the academy. Legal writing is recognized as an 
important skill, requiring skilled instruction, and devoted teachers. Legal 
writing teachers however are underpaid and under-recognized in much of 
the law school academy.245 While great strides have been made to improve 
the status of legal writing teachers in law schools, their place is one that is 
still on the margins in many schools.246 While legal writing professionals 
are marginalized in the academy, their courses are often the most 
pedagogically sound and practical.247 Legal writing teachers are often 
244 See Cornwell, supra note 100, at 56 ("Students are taught that the strength of a legal 
assertion lies in its familiarity; original ideas are by nature idiosyncratic and untrustworthy."); see 
also Parker, supra note 100, at 597; Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 100, at 59. 
245 See Peter Brandon Bayer, A Plea for Rationality and Decency; The Disparate Treatment of 
Legal Writing Faculties as a Violation of Both Equal Protection and Professional Ethics, 39 DUQ. 
L. REv. 329,353-56 (2001); see also Susan P. Liemer & Jan M. Levine, Legal Research and 
Writing: What Schools Are Doing, and Who Is Doing the Teaching (Three Years Later), 9 
SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 113, 113 (2004); Kathryn M. Stanchi & Jan M. Levine, Gender and 
Legal Writing: Law Schools' Dirty Little Secrets, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 1,10-12 (2001). 
246 See Maureen J. Arrigo, Hierarchy Maintained: Status and Gender Issues in Legal Writing 
Programs, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 117, 121, 137, 148, 150 (1997); see also Pamela Edwards, Teaching 
Legal Writing as Women's Work: Life on the Fringes of the Academy, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN'S LJ. 
75, 103 (1997) (pointing out that legal writing professors, who are mostly women, will continue to 
be marginalized by the legal Academy until schools change their cultures and allow legal writing 
professors to gain full status in the academy); Eichhorn, supra note 2, at 113; Mary Ellen Gale, 
Legal Writing: The Impossible Takes a Little Longer, 44 ALB. L. REv. 298, 320 (1980); Liemer & 
Levine, supra note 245, at 129-34; Stanchi, supra note 164, at 1112 (highlighting the paradox 
(described as Zeno's Paradox) that arises from the inequity of legal writing faculty salaries-
although equity gets closer, it can never be reached because as writing faculty salaries increase, 
doctrinal faculty salaries increase as well); William R. Trail & William D. Underwood, The 
Decline of ProfeSSional Legal Training and a Proposal for Its Revitalization in Professional Law 
Schools, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 201, 235 (1996). 
247 See Neal Feigenson, Essay Review, 41 J. LEGALEDUC. 503, 503 n.l. 
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called on to perfonn some of the most important law school fimctions. In 
addition, legal writing professionals are sometimes asked to fix bar passage 
and retention problems, provide academic support and run orientation 
programs for entering students to boost student perfonnance and 
satisfaction.248 These additional duties, while they mayor may not be 
compensated, paradoxically, are not truly valued.249 Scholarship is the area 
that many law faculties indicate is important for advancement in the 
profession and is used to justify a lower status for legal writing 
professionals in the academy.250 Paradoxically, legal writing professionals 
are simultaneously not given institutional support, time, space, and 
encouragement to perfonn writing which is so highly valued. It is 
paradoxical and ironic that those members of the legal academy paid and 
trained to teach writing are implicitly discouraged from the act of writing. 
Other paradoxes arise from the nature of law and language itself. Since 
both law and language are by their nature changing and evolving matter, 
reducing law and legal language to tenns of art, jargon or elemental rules, 
paradoxically both advances and hinders the profession.251 Legallanguage, 
as most irritatingly epitomized by legalese and more benignly by jargon, 
[T]he pedagogy of the writing course is often far sounder than that of the typical 
doctrinal course: in the writing course, for instance, tasks and goals are made explicit, 
giving students a better context for learning; students produce well-defined work, 
whether vllritten or spoken, which the instructors critique promptly and with 
constructive detail; and so on. The paradox, of course, is that the limited resources and 
inferior status of most legal writing programs ought, if anything, to excuse any . 
perceived ineffectiveness when they are compared to other courses. 
Id. (citing JEROME S. BRUNER, TOWARD A THEORY OF INSTRUCTION 40-53 (1966)). 
248 See M.H. Sam Jacobson, Providing Academic Support Without an Academic Support 
Program, 3 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING IN ST. 241,257 (1997); Dionne L. Koller, Legal 
Writing and Academic Support: Timing Is Everything, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 51, 52-54 (2005); 
Nancy L. Schultz, There's a New Test in Town: Preparing Students for the MPT, PERSP.: 
TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 14,14 (1999). 
249 See Liemer, supra note 231, at 1017-18. 
250 See id.; see also Ann C. McGinley Discrimination in Our Midst: Law Schools' Potential 
Liability for Employment Practices, 14 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 15-16 (2005). 
251 See Pollman, supra note 130, at 890. ("[T]he paradox of the developing professional 
language: that it simultaneously hinders and advances communication about legal writing."). 
Language itself raises paradoxes such as the paradox of persuasion: "The harder you argue, the 
less persuasive you are." Susan Hanley Kosse & DavidT. ButleRitchie, How Judges, 
Practitioners, and Legal Writing Teachers Assess the Writing Skills of New Law Graduates: A 
Comparative Study, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 80, 91 (2003). 
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both advances the profession, by creating a shared language and source for 
communicating ideas, and hinders the profession, by simultaneously 
reducing and fixing these ideas, which effectively stifles and oversimplifies 
the complexity and organic nature of the law.252 Law also contains the 
paradox of the difference between the aspiration of the rule of law as 
written and that which is practiced. The law, in its written form, seeks 
coherence, rationality and consistency in the regulation of society, but the 
law, as practiced, is often aphasic, contradictory, and perverse.253 The role 
of teaching both law and writing places the legal writing professional in the 
middle of these paradoxes.254 It is these paradoxes which illustrate legal 
writing profession's postmodem condition. 
X. CONCLUSION: ACKNOWLEDGING AND CELEBRATING THE 
POSTMODERN ATTRIBUTES OF AND POSTMODERNISM'S 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LEGAL WRITING PROFESSION 
Scholars have lamented legal writing's anomalous status in the legal 
academy.255 Some have stated legal writing "lacks pedigree, has no grand 
theory" or "pedagogy of its own.,,256 Others have called teaching legal 
writing the "art of the impossible.,,257 Such is not the state of legal writing 
today. With two national organizations and multiple journals devoted 
directly to the field and many journals regularly devoting issues to the 
subject, legal writing has a pedagogy of its own which is as coherent as any 
pedagogy found in the legal academy.258 As argued in this Article, a 
component of this pedagogy has a strikingly postmodem bent. 
Pollman. supra note 130, at 890 (rejecting the regulation of legal writing jargon or 
language because that approach will stifle creativity and vitality in a new area but embracing the 
study of the emerging professional language). 
Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L REv. 1053, 1082-83 (1989). 
254 See Pollman, supra note 130, at 888. 
255 See Lome Sossin, Discourse Politics: Legal Research and Writing's Search for a 
Pedagogy of Its Own, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 883, 884 (1995). 
256 See Id. at 884, 896. 
257 See Id. at 884. 
258 The problem is that the legal academy does not have a coherent pedagogy of its own. The 
McCrate report and numerous articles attest to the schizophrenic nature of law school pedagogy, 
groping between its academic and trade orientations. 
Professors Jill J. Ramsfield and J. Christopher Rideout eloquently described the 
immense potential for legal writing scholarship: "We are scholars of a new discipline. 
Our work, so carefully cut out for us by our predecessors, continues .... We do not yet 
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Imagine three legal writing professors, one each from 1980, 1990 and 
2000, visiting each other's classrooms.259 The professor from 1980 might 
have a hard time recognizing the class in 1990 and probably would be lost 
or amazed in 2000.260 The change which has occurred is attributable, at 
least in part, to postmodernism; the tremendous change reflects the 
postmodem attributes found across the academy, the student body, and 
society as a whole.261 
The postmodem attributes of and influences on the teaching of legal 
writing are not bad or dangerous. They do not indicate that the teaching of 
legal writing is particularly associated with any political movement or left-
wing ideology.262 As mentioned earlier, postmodemism is politically 
neutral as a theory and, similarly, legal writing is politically neutral as a 
discipline.263 
know the depth of our discipline, nor have we fully articulated its breadth. We own a 
rare moment in scholarship, a moment of discovery and careful preservation, a moment 
of intellectual adventure." 
Smith, supra note 62, at 26 (quoting Jill J. Ramsfie1d & J. Christopher Rideout, Scholarship in 
Legal Writing, in THE POLlTICS OF LEGAL WRITING 91 (Jan Levine, Rebecca Cochran & Steve 
Johansen eds., 1995)). 
259 But see Wendy Bishop, Because Teaching CompOSitions is (Still) Mostly About Teaching 
Composition, COMPOSITION STUDIES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: REREADING THE PAST, 
REWRITING THE FUTURE 65 (Lynn Z. Bloom et al. eds., 2003) (recognizing the similarity among 
the classrooms' pedagogy over the past twenty years). I believe legal writing classrooms have 
changed more dramatically during this time period. 
260 The use of computers and the internet have changed the way legal writing is done, taught 
and imagined. Teaching methods have changed; there is a vast choice of textbooks, exercises, and 
resources. The legal writing academy has grown and has become firmly established. See Durako, 
supra note 105, at 115-16; see also Levine, supra note 105, at 59; Ramsfie1d, supra note 105, at 
123-27; Smith, supra note 103, at 123-27; Smith, supra note 62, at 6,8. 
261 See James Seaton, The Metaphysics of Postmodernism, HUMANITAS, Spring 1999, at 104, 
104, available at http://www.nhinet.orglseatom.htm (reviewing CARL RApP, FLEEING THE 
UNIVERSAL, THE CRITIQUE OF POST-RATIONAL CRITICISM 272 (1998)) ("The thesis that 
contemporary society is postmodernist does not assert that most people consciously accept 
postmodernist doctrines but that these doctrines reflect the working assumptions that most of us 
live by but refuse to acknowledge. It seems clear that there is little public support for the 
theoretical notion that there is no significant distinction between truth and falsehood, but it is 
unclear to what extent we remain willing to acknowledge the authority of objective truth when 
such acknowledgement is politically or personally inconvenient."). 
262 See Balkin, supra note 179, at 733-35; see also FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 43-44. 
263 See FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 132. 
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The legal writing profession did not consciously embrace 
postmodernism nor is it deliberately postmodern in character. The 
profession, however, has attributes of both modernism and 
postmodernism.264 The movement from modernism to postmodernism is a 
natural part of the humanist impulse to search for truth and certainty in an 
unstable world. The tension created between the normative needs of the 
law and the fluidity and evolving nature of the law is most acute when 
teaching legal writing. Similar tensions arise from the normative needs of 
the writer's audience and the writing's purpose conflicting with the fluidity 
and constructs of the writer's thinking process and writing habits. Both 
writing and law are uncertain creatures subject to change and flux. 
Postmodernism is the appropriate theory for exposing what the legal writing 
profession endeavors. 
Postmodernism has been and remains a useful tool in the toolbox of 
legal writing professionals.265 The process method of teaching legal writing 
was influenced by postmodernism. As a theory, postmodernism provides 
insight into the writing process and how to intervene as a teacher in it. 
Postmodernism's outgrowths such as deconstruction and the recognition of 
the power of narrative have altered the way the legal profession sees writing 
and teaches it. The legal writing profession's ability to bridge the 
modernist needs of the legal academy and profession with the postmodern 
realities of society and practice is the ultimate strength and value of legal 
WIlting. 
But the interconnection of postmodernism and the teaching of legal 
writing might help explain the political issue of its marginalized status in 
the academy. As Professor Eichhorn pointed out, "legal writing is a 
dangerous supplement, capable of breaking down the dichotomies upon 
which the legal academy has relied to keep its hierarchical house in 
order.,,266 In addition, the ontological uncertainty raised by the teaching of 
legal writing and that a scholarly examination of legal writing requires, can 
also be viewed as dangerous in a profession which privileges modernist and 
positivist positions regarding the law. 
The postmodern characteristics of legal writing, however, do not need to 
be dangerous or threatening to the legal academy. Postmodernism, at least 
264 The relationship between modernism and postmodemism is not necessarily dichotomous. 
See id. at 187. 
265 See id. at 152, 187. 
266 See Eichhorn, supra note 2, 117. 
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in the spirit of the more affirmative postmodernists or pragmatics, is a 
supplement to modernism not its opposition.267 Indeed the growth of the 
legal writing movement and the increasing number of legal writing 
positions that are tenure-track are a testament to the recognition that legal 
writing is not dangerous but a necessary component of the legal academy.268 
It may be the perceived danger of this postmodern bent that causes some 
to marginalize the profession of the teaching of legal writing. But, like 
postmodern theory itself, legal writing as a profession has become 
entrenched in the academy. As generations of law students are graduating 
from law schools with legal writing pedagogy instilled into their training, 
legal writing pedagogy in both its modern and postmodern forms will 
become even more firmly entrenched in the academy and the profession. 
Through this process, legal writing, like postmodernism, is moving from the 
margins to the mainstream, ultimately demonstrating that legal writing and 
postmodernism are neither dead nor dangerous. 
267 As discussed earlier in this Article, many of the critics of postmodernism see it as a danger 
or threat because they put it in opposition to or in duality with modernism. Such dualistic thinking 
is itself one of the limitations of modernism and modernistic thinking. See FELDMAN, supra note 
7, at 132. 
268See generally Association of Legal Writing Directors, ALWDILWI LRN Survey Reports, 
available at http://www.alwd.orgl (last visitcd Sept. 28, 2006) (containing national survey reports 
oflegal writing professors' salaries from 1999 until 2006); see also Liemer & Levine, supra note 
245, at 119-29. 
